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At the Intersection of Land Grievances and Legal
Liability: The Need to Reconsider Contract Rights
and Expectations at the Supranational Level
Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Lise Johnson, and Sam Szoke-Burke*
This Article explores how host governments’ legal obligations can
affect or constrain their ability to address “land grievances,” which are
defined as concerns raised by local individuals or communities in
response to negative impacts of land-based investments. Obligations
under international investment law, international human rights law, and
investor-state contracts can be in tension or can directly conflict with
one another, creating complexity for governments seeking to respond to
land grievances. To explore the legal considerations that governments
must navigate in this context, this Article considers several options that
governments could pursue to respond to land grievances. In all of the
options considered, the governmental action would also implicate
investors’ contract rights or expectations, making the rights and
obligations under investment treaties particularly important to
consider. Given the challenges arising from these options, and in light
of the critical need for governments to protect human rights and
address their citizens’ concerns, the Article concludes with a call to
reassess the elevation of contract rights and expectations to a
supranational level via international investment law. In the absence of a
more comprehensive overhaul of the investment law system, a more
critical approach by arbitral tribunals regarding the nature and scope
of contract rights (and expectations) deemed enforceable could help
limit the potential for arbitral decisions to undermine governments’
abilities to address the concerns, and protect the rights, of their citizens.

* Kaitlin Y. Cordes is Head of Land and Agriculture and Lead: Human Rights and Investment,
Lise Johnson is Head of Investment Law and Policy, and Sam Szoke-Burke is a Legal Researcher
at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. This Article draws in part from research
undertaken for a Center paper on a similar topic: Cordes, Johnson, and Szoke-Burke, “Land Deal
Dilemmas: Grievances, Human Rights, and Investor Protections,” Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment (March 2016), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2016/03/10/land-deal-dilemmasgrievances-human-rights-and-investor-protections/.
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INTRODUCTION
Toward the end of 2015, the government of Ethiopia canceled a land
lease contract held by an Indian investor. 1 Under the contract, the
investor—which boasts of undertaking agricultural production “on a
mega scale”2—leased 100,000 hectares of land for an annual payment
of slightly under USD $1/hectare.3 The Ethiopian government has
1. William Davison, Karuturi Challenges Ethiopia Decision to Cancel Farm Project,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS
(Jan.
11,
2016,
9:24
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-11/karuturi-challenges-ethiopian-decision-tocancel-farming-project; Birhanu Fikade, Karuturi Contemplates Legal Recourse for Loss in
Ethiopia,
THE
REPORTER
ETHIOPIA
(Sept.
30,
2017),
http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/business/karuturi-contemplates-legal-recourse-loss-ethiopia;
Staff Reporter, Government Agency Strips Karuturi’s Land Privilege, CAPITAL ETHIOPIA (Jan.
15,
2016),
http://capitalethiopia.com/2016/01/15/government-agency-strips-karuturis-landprivilege/.
2. KARUTURI GLOBAL LIMITED, http://www.karuturi.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
3. Land Rent Contractual Agreement Made Between Ministry of Agric. & Rural Development
and Karuturi Agro Prods. Plc., arts. 1.1, 2.2.1, 3.6, 5 (Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Land Lease
Agreement] (stating that the annual lease rate/hectare is 20 birr, which converts to slightly under
USD $1. The lease also provided the right to receive an additional 200,000 hectares if
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controversially welcomed a number of large-scale agricultural
investments despite allegations of associated human rights violations.4
The Ethiopian government reportedly asserted that the contract
termination was due to the investor’s failure to sufficiently develop the
land.5 The limited development had not, however, prevented negative
impacts on local communities; researchers, for example, have alleged
that the crops of indigenous people were cleared without consent in the
investment area.6 In response to the government’s decision to cancel,
the investor asserted that the government’s action constituted an
expropriation in contravention of the bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”)
between India and Ethiopia, and noted that it was prepared to seek
arbitration.7
Regardless of its outcome, this story may presage a new phase in the
recent global land rush. As land-based investments for agriculture or
forestry projects stall, fail, or face entrenched local opposition, the
action or inaction of governments may be more likely to give rise to
potential legal disputes, brought by investors as well as by projectaffected individuals or communities. At the same time, host
governments are under growing pressure to ensure that land-based
investments are responsible, as well as to better protect the tenure rights
of land users generally.8 As this confluence of factors evolves, host
development goals were met on the first concession area).
4. See, e.g., David Smith, Ethiopians Talk of Violent Intimidation as Their Land is Earmarked
for
Foreign
Investors,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
14,
2015,
7:14
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/14/ethiopia-villagisation-violence-land-grab
(discussing the human impact of villagization, violent conflict, and investment).
5. Amare Asrat, Agency Terminates Contract with Karuturi, FANA BROADCASTING
CORPORATE (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.fanabc.com/english/index.php/news/item/4810-agencyterminates-contract-with-karuturi.
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WAITING HERE FOR DEATH”: DISPLACEMENT AND
“VILLAGIZATION” IN ETHIOPIA’S GAMBELLA REGION 56 (2012).
7. Davison, supra note 1; Fikade, supra note 1; see also Investment Policy Hub: International
Investment Agreements Navigator: Ethiopia, Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/67 (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) (giving
information on Ethiopia’s BITs). This may be an empty threat: the bilateral investment treaty
between Ethiopia and India has been signed but may not be in force. See also Land Lease
Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 17 (stating that the land lease agreement does not contain an
arbitration clause, but rather states that disputes will “be referred to Ethiopian Federal Court”).
8. This is partly in response to the perceived “global land rush” that followed the 2007–2008
food price crisis, leading donors, UN technical agencies, civil society, and other stakeholders to
have increasingly pushed for responsible land-based investments (or for no large-scale land-based
investments at all, as argued by some civil society activists and others). This push led to, among
other things, the Principles for the Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems,
which are the product of high-level intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder negotiations at the
Committee on World Food Security. COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEMS (2014) [hereinafter WFS
PRINCIPLES]. The pressure to ensure more responsible land-based investments has occurred
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governments will more frequently confront the thorny question of how
to deal with problems stemming from existing land-based investments
in light of their legal obligations to different individuals, communities,
and entities.
This Article explores how governments’ legal obligations can affect
or constrain the ability of host governments to address “land
grievances,” which we define as concerns raised by local individuals or
communities in response to the actual, perceived, or potential negative
impacts of land-based investments. Legal obligations under
international investment law, international human rights law, and
investor-state contracts are particularly important. If human rights are in
tension with investor protections, then one or more of the stakeholders
risk bearing a significant burden (communities and individuals risk
having their human rights violated), governments risk having to pay
large awards (or high legal costs) under international investment law,
and investors risk disruption to, or termination of, their business
operations. In attempting to identify options to address grievances
within the context of governments’ complex web of legal obligations,
this Article also seeks to advance discussions on the perils of, and
possible remedies for, the current fragmentation in international law.
Part I provides an overview of land-based investments and the
grievances they engender. Part II focuses on the obligations and redress
mechanisms found in international investment law, international human
rights law, and investor-state contracts, as well as some of the ways in
which these obligations intersect and interact, and the challenges this
can create for governments. Part III discusses three options that
governments have to address land grievances—renegotiating investorstate contracts, terminating contracts, and modifying the domestic legal
framework—as a way to explore the accompanying legal considerations
that governments must navigate, in particular when investors’ contract
rights or expectations stand to be both affected by governmental action
and elevated to a supranational level through interpretation of an
investment treaty. Part IV concludes with a call to reassess whether, and
if so which, contract rights or expectations should be elevated to a
supranational level via international investment law.
against the backdrop of a greater push at the international level to ensure better protection of
tenure rights of all legitimate land users. This focus on tenure rights is best exemplified by the
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests
in the Context of National Food Security, also the result of high-level intergovernmental
negotiations at the Committee on World Food Security. COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD
SECURITY, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND,
FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (2012) [hereinafter
WFS GUIDELINES].

2017]

Land Grievances and Legal Liability

519

I. LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS AND LAND GRIEVANCES
A. How Investments Occur and How They are Regulated
A “global land rush” in the past two decades has been characterized
by a marked increase in large-scale investments for agricultural,
forestry, and other land-intensive projects, particularly in low- and
middle-income countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.9
Commercial motives, sometimes coupled with food security concerns,
have been a main driver of investor interest;10 on the receiving end,
countries have pursued such investment in the hopes that it will generate
a range of coveted benefits including new capital, jobs, increased
exports, and improved agricultural productivity. 11 Although the scale of
these land-based investments may not be as large as often described,12
many land-based investments already implemented have had significant
impacts on local communities.
The process for investing in agriculture or forestry in any particular
country is highly context-specific, depending on national, and
sometimes sub-national, laws and policies.13 Yet, some general
observations on how such investments occur and are regulated provide a
basis for understanding the role of governments in facilitating,
9. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ADDRESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS OF ‘LAND
GRABBING’ 8 (July 15, 2014) [hereinafter Impacts of ‘Land Grabbing’] (discussing the renewed
interest in agricultural land); Rabah Arezki et al., What Drives the Global “Land Rush”?, 29
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 207, 207 (2013) (discussing “marked increases in the demand for
agricultural land”); Kate Geary, “Our Land, Our Lives”: Time Out on the Global Land Rush,
OXFAM INT’L 2 (Oct. 2012) (discussing the boom in food prices as triggering increased investor
interest in land); Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food,
49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101, 105–06 (2013) (discussing how “purchasing and leasing agricultural
land in developing countries has skyrocketed”).
10. Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of
Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 512–17 (2011); Narula, supra note 9, at 105–12.
11. Narula, supra note 9, at 103; LORENZO COTULA ET AL., LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT
OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA 5,
78–83 (2009) [hereinafter LAND DEALS IN AFRICA]; The Practice of Responsible Investment
Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural Investments: Implications for Corporate Performance
and Impact on Local Communities, THE WORLD BANK REPORT NO. 86175-GLB (2014).
12. See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula et al., Testing Claims About Large Land Deals in Africa:
Findings from a Multi-Country Study, 50 J. DEV. STUD. 903, 905 (2014) (finding that “land
acquisition accounts for a small share of land suitable for agriculture in each country”).
13. International and extraterritorial laws and policies can also influence and affect such
investment. Given this Article’s primary focus on host governments seeking to address land
grievances, this Section explores processes for investment within host countries, and sets aside
the potential or actual influence of international laws or policies that might shape domestic laws
and policies relevant to investment processes, although interactions between international and
domestic law are considered in the following Section. This Section also does not consider the
extraterritorial laws and policies that could influence how foreign investors undertake investments
in certain scenarios.
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participating in, and monitoring such investments, as well as the steps
they may take to address related grievances.
The land required for an investment may come from the government,
a community, or private individuals.14 This Article focuses on contexts
in which the government is involved either in transferring the land
directly to an investor, or in otherwise facilitating the investment—for
example, signing an investment incentive contract with a particular
investor. Direct transfer of land by governments for purposes of
agriculture or forestry investments has occurred most frequently in SubSaharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where governments have entered
into agreements with investors that allow the use of public, national, or
state land (which may be technically owned by the government, even
when others have legitimate tenure rights over the land in question).15
In some places, laws may require private land to be transferred to the
government before it can be leased to a foreign investor.16
Investors may acquire land for agriculture or forestry through
purchases (sales), leases, or concessions.17 A review of publicly
14. The question of who has the right to allocate land to investors is highly specific, differing
between and sometimes within countries. Even within specific contexts, the answers may be
debatable: for example, a central government may claim legal authority to allocate land
designated as state or public land, while land users whose families have used that same land for
generations may dispute that authority—and may have backing for their position under
international human rights law, or from soft law documents such as the Voluntary Guidelines on
the Responsible Governance of Tenure. To generalize, however: in countries where land is owned
or controlled primarily by the State, as in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast
Asia, the government generally allocates land to investors via long-term leases or concessions.
Where land is controlled by customary authorities, it is generally those authorities who allocate
land. When land is owned primarily by individuals, such as in much of Latin America, those
individual landowners are generally the ones to allocate land to investors. See Impacts of ‘Land
Grabbing’, supra note 9, at 14.
15. This generalization does not hold true of all countries within the regions. In Ghana, for
example, most land is not considered to be owned by the state, and customary chiefs frequently
sign land leases for investment purposes. LAND DEALS IN AFRICA, supra note 11, at 78;
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., 2015–2016 ANNUAL REPORT (Oct. 7, 2015).
16. In Tanzania, for example, village land or private land must be transferred to a national
entity before a derivative right can be given to a foreign investor. Services to Investors,
TANZANIA INVESTMENT CENTRE, http://tanzania.eregulations.org/menu/196?l=en (last visited
Nov. 22, 2017).
17. Land acquisition is not always needed for forestry projects. In some jurisdictions,
investors in forestry projects can acquire licenses, permits, or “profits a prendre” that provide the
investor with access to forest resources without actually transferring possession or control of the
land itself. Governance Principles for Concessions and Contracts in Public Forests, FOOD &
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., 45–54 (2001). Such licenses and permits generally provide access to
resources on public land, but may also be used to help regulate forestry activities on private land,
like the Private Use Permits that have been used in Liberia (which have been heavily criticized).
See, e.g., An Act Adopting the National Forestry Reform Law of 2006, §§ 5.1–5.7 (Liber.)
[hereinafter NFRL] (establishing Private Use Permits); GLOBAL WITNESS, SIGNING THEIR LIVES
AWAY: LIBERIA’S PRIVATE USE PERMITS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY-OWNED
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available investor-state contracts for agriculture and forestry projects
shows that most contracts take the form of leases or concessions, rather
than sales.18 While such land use transfers are thus time-bound, they can
still cover a significant length of time, with many agreements spanning
anywhere from twenty-five years to ninety-nine years.19 The length of
these agreements may be governed by law or otherwise standardized
within a country.20 This is not always static. For example, in Cambodia,
Economic Land Concessions (“ELCs”) for industrial-scale agriculture
have been limited to ninety-nine years, but the government has more
recently moved to limit the duration of certain concessions to fifty years
as part of a larger review of new and existing ELCs mandated in 2012.21
Investor-state contracts differ in their complexity, as well as in their
purported comprehensiveness. Some contracts are predicated on the
receipt of additional permits or approvals, while others may endeavor to
settle all relevant issues related to the underlying project, including by
obligating the government to ensure that any requisite authorizations are
provided as needed.22
RAINFOREST (Sept. 2012) (also discussing Liberia’s Private Use Permits).
18. At the time of writing, OpenLandContracts.org, a global repository of publicly available
investor-state contracts for agriculture or forestry projects, showed 154 unique contracts from
fourteen countries (Cambodia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, and TimorLeste), and only one involved a sale. However, because investments in land for agriculture and
forestry projects are relatively opaque as compared to other types of resource investments, it is
impossible to draw definitive conclusions based on publicly available documents.
19. See, e.g., Ministère de l’Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme, Contrat
de Concession Forestiere, Republique Democratique du Congo, art. 3 (Oct. 24, 2011) (term of
twenty-five years); Land Rent Contractual Agreement Made Between Ministry of Agric. & Saudi
Star Agric. Dev. Plc., art. 2.1 (2010) (term of fifty years); Agreement for Plantation of Sugar
Cane, & Processing Factory of Sugar Cane Between The Ministry of Agric., Forestry & Fisheries
and Koh Kong Sugar Indus. Co. Ltd., Cambodia, art. 2.1 (Aug. 2, 2006) (term of ninety years).
20. In Liberia, for example, the National Forestry Reform Law of 2006 establishes different
types of forestry concessions in Liberia, with the larger concessions requiring a term that
“approximate[s] the length of a forest rotation on the land based on a sustainable yield of Timber
products,” and the smaller concessions restricted to a term of no more than three years. NFRL,
supra note 17, at § 5.3(b)(viii), § 5.4(b)(iii). A review of publicly available land contracts and
other publicly available concession information shows consistency in contract durations within
countries as well: for example, all of the publicly available Ethiopian land lease agreements
provided to foreign investors are for twenty-five years.
21. Social Land Concessions, OPEN DEVELOPMENT CAMBODIA (Aug. 4, 2015)
http://www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/briefing/economic-land-concessions-elcs/;
Concessions,
OPEN
DEVELOPMENT
CAMBODIA
(Aug.
4,
2015)
https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/concessions/#ref-.
22. Without weighing in on the legality of this, the Establishment Convention by & Between
The Republic of Cameroon and SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC., which freezes the list of
authorizations needed, notes that they shall be provided without payments, and states that the
“[g]overnment undertakes to promptly provide to Investor, and to cause any Governmental
Authority to provide to Investor all certificates, exemptions, waivers, consents, licenses, permits,
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In general, receiving the rights to use land is often only one of many
steps to be undertaken before a land-based investment can be
implemented. Requirements established by law or articulated in the
relevant investor-state contract may, for example, require the investor to
conduct an environmental impact assessment or receive an investment
license before commencing.23 While investment promotion agencies
may seek to smooth the path for investors in acquiring any necessary
authorizations, the extent to which they can do so in practice may be
limited, as the processes for granting relevant authorizations are
generally handled by different levels of government, or different
departments or ministries, that must enforce their own mandates.
Throughout the lifecycle of an investment, the government is
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the investor’s commitments
and obligations—both those arising under domestic law and those
flowing from investor-state contracts. Even highly resourced
governments struggle to adequately monitor and enforce all relevant
regulations pertaining to investors and other corporate actors; this can
be an even greater challenge for less-resourced governments.24 Such
difficulties are exacerbated when governments allow an expansive use
of investor-state contracts to develop—in essence, unique legal regimes
for each investment. When issues such as tax payments, local hiring,
and water usage are negotiated and regulated via individual contracts
rather than under a comprehensive and broadly applicable legal
framework, host governments must then find a way to monitor each
investor against a set of unique requirements and obligations. In the
context of land-based investment, governments—many of which
already struggle to monitor and enforce regulations—may not have the
resources or capacity to properly monitor the complex agreements into
which they enter.
easements, documents and other authorizations, to the extent any of the foregoing are or may be
desirable or necessary.” Establishment Convention by & Between The Republic of Cameroon and
SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC., § 4.11(c) (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Sustainable Oils
Cameroon].
23. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between The Gov’t of The Republic of Sierra
Leone and Sierra Akker Agric. Co. Ltd., app’x, arts. 2, 6 (June 2013). Article 2 of the appendix
notes that the company will be granted all required permits and authorizations so long as the
company complies with all published legal requirements. Id. at art. 2. Article 6 of the appendix
states that the environmental license will be granted, subject to requisite conditions, unless
withheld for lawful reasons or unless the company’s environmental management plan and
environmental and social assessment are not adequately implemented. Id. at art. 6.
24. David Graham & Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation Effective in
Developing Countries, 34 WORLD DEV. 868, 868 (2006) (“No country boasts perfect
regulation—indeed the recent corporate collapses of ENRON and WorldCom exposed significant
gaps. However, yet more serious gaps exist in most developing countries where governments
have far less capacity to regulate.”).
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Governments are dynamic; therefore, laws and policies of general
applicability that affect an investment may be enacted, modified, or
terminated during an investment. These changes may create or modify
other regulatory requirements imposed on the investor. Investors
generally must comply with these changes regardless of the impact on
their operations, although contractual provisions (such as stabilization
clauses) and other domestic or international legal rules may limit the
applicability of some (or, increasingly rarely, all) changes, as discussed
further in Part II.C.
Using the processes described above, governments have the
opportunity to shape the types, design, and implementation of new
investments in agriculture or forestry. Some of these processes are also
relevant when governments seek to address the grievances related to
ongoing investments. For example, a governmental entity may decide to
cancel (or not grant) a license or permit required for operations, to
request renegotiation of the investor-state contract, or to enact a law that
creates new regulatory requirements. Actions that negatively affect an
investment, however, may prompt an investor to seek relief, such as
through lobbying or by bringing legal challenges in national or
international courts or tribunals.
B. Land Grievances: Causes and Incentives for Redress
1. Common Causes of Land Grievances
Investments in land for agriculture or forestry projects have led to
numerous types of grievances on the part of local communities and
individuals around the world.25 Documented grievances have occurred
at all stages of the project cycle, sometimes starting even before project
implementation.26 Grievances have arisen not only when the
25. The discussion of land grievances in this sub-section draws primarily from the authors’
review of forty cases of grievances arising from agriculture or forestry investments, as well as
interviews conducted by the authors with lawyers, advocates, and others who work with
communities or host governments. See Land Deal Dilemmas: Grievances, Human Rights, and
Investor
Protections,
COLUMBIA
CTR.
ON
SUSTAINABLE
INV.
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/land-grievances/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) (containing a
list of examples of grievances and allegations).
26. See, e.g., Rhett Butler, Malaysian Palm Oil Giant Loses PNG Case, Plantations Declared
Illegal, MONGABAY (May 24, 2014), https://news.mongabay.com/2014/05/malaysian-palm-oilgiant-loses-png-case-plantations-declared-illegal (“[t]he people of Collingwood Bay have spoken
clearly through the voices of our chiefs that we are against large scale palm oil development on
our lands”); Villagers Secure Victory Over Malaysian Land Grabbers in Papua New Guinea,
FARMLANDGRAB.ORG (May 21, 2014), https://farmlandgrab.org/23526 (noting that even though
the people of Collingwood Bay were ultimately successful in their battle for their land they are
still mindful of the “innocent families and other communities struggling [throughout] the country
with the same problem”).
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government transferred the land in question, but also when the land was
provided by a local community or individuals.27 While land grievances
are context-specific, and any particular grievance is unique to the
project and the affected community, issues that appear especially likely
to create or exacerbate grievances include:
Displacement from land and resources (whether physical or
economic,28 and including concerns around a failure to obtain free,
prior, and informed consent (“FPIC”), a lack of adequate consultation,
and inadequate compensation);
Negative effects on the environment or cultural sites (which may
be inherent to the project—for instance, the razing of forested land to
make way for a greenfield palm oil plantation—or may be caused by a
failure to adequately mitigate such effects);
Failure to realize benefits from projects (including grievances
regarding the quality or quantity of jobs reserved for locals, or regarding
the provision of infrastructure or social services);
Violence,29 intimidation, the repression of protests, or
27. See, e.g., Final Monitoring Report: On the Operations and the Scale Down of Addax
Bioenergy in Makeni, Sierra Leone, SIERRA LEONE NETWORK ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD
(SILNORF) 3–6 (June 2016) (discussing grievances of community members in Bombali and
Tonkolili districts concerning Addax Bioenergy Sierra Leone Ltd.’s Makeni project). See Jennifer
Kennedy, Sierra Leone Farmers Evicted for Sugarcane Biofuel Plantations, CORPWATCH BLOG
(Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15822 (discussing the fallout from
people losing their farms); see also Memorandum of Understanding & Agreement Between the
Gov’t of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Addax Bioenergy Sierra Leone Ltd. and Addax & Oryx
Holdings BV, art. 2 (Feb. 9, 2010) (allowing for land clearance).
28. The IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability define
physical displacement as “relocation or loss of shelter” and economic displacement as “loss of
assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood.” INT’L
FIN. CORP., PERFORMANCE STANDARD 5: LAND ACQUISITION AND INVOLUNTARY
RESETTLEMENT 1, ¶ 1 (Jan. 1, 2012).
29. At the most extreme, this can even result in fatalities, including of innocent bystanders.
The advocacy group Global Witness has documented more than a thousand murders of land and
environmental defenders since 2002, including in the context of land-based investments. In 2015,
Global Witness found twenty killings that were linked to “[a]gribusiness grabbing land for largescale plantations,” and 185 murders in total. On Dangerous Ground, GLOBAL WITNESS 18 (June
20, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/dangerous-ground/; see also Deadly
Environment: The Dramatic Rise in Killings of Environmental and Land Defenders, GLOBAL
WITNESS
5,
13
(2014),
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmentalactivists/deadly-environment/ (documenting 908 land/environmental defenders killed in thirtyfive countries between 2002 and 2013, and arguing that an increasing death rate is linked to
commercial pressures on land). In Cambodia, for example, the military stormed a village to carry
out a forced eviction after an investor allegedly encroached on community members’ farms. The
military’s action resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old girl hit by gunfire. U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, CAMBODIA 2012 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT (2013); CAMBODIAN LEAGUE FOR THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, ATTACKS & THREATS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN CAMBODIA 11 (Dec.
2012) [hereinafter CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS].
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inappropriate detentions or arrests (all of which can be part of a
downward spiral in which investments create grievances; individuals or
communities air these grievances through demonstrations or other
advocacy strategies, and the investor or the government then attempts to
clamp down on such actions through violence or arrests30); and
Illegality,31 potential corruption32 or conflicts of interest, and
lack of transparency (which are not always the initial cause of
investment-related concerns, but which can exacerbate grievances and
create additional frustration, and may be highlighted in advocacy or
legal actions against the investment).
Of the forty cases reviewed for this research, displacement from land
and resources was the most common source of grievances. Because land
is often important both as an economic asset and for social, cultural,
political, or spiritual reasons, displacement can be devastating. At times,
investments can be linked to the physical and/or economic displacement
of thousands of individuals.33 Although governments may describe
public or state land as “available” for investment, such land is often
occupied, used, or relied on by local communities or individuals.34 On
30. See CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS, supra note 29, at 13 (discussing the inappropriate violence
accompanying arrests).
31. For example, in Cambodia, government officials have granted economic land concessions
that have not met requisite pre-conditions, that exceed legal size limits, or that otherwise run
contrary to applicable laws. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC LAND CONCESSIONS IN CAMBODIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE, ¶¶ 8–12 (June
2007). In Papua New Guinea, a Commission of Inquiry investigating Special Agriculture &
Business Leases found that multiple leases failed to comply with statutory requirements, and
ultimately recommended replacing the entire system of leases due to serious abuses. John
Numapo, Final Report, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE SPECIAL AGRICULTURE AND
BUSINESS
LEASES
(SABL)
(June
24,
2013),
https://pngexposed.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/numapo-sabl-final-report.pdf.
32. OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, TAINTED LANDS: CORRUPTION IN LARGE-SCALE LAND DEALS,
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE AND GLOBAL WITNESS (Nov.
2016).
33. See, e.g., Koh Kong sugar plantation lawsuits (re Cambodia), BUSINESS & HUMAN
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://business-humanrights.org/en/koh-kong-sugar-plantationlawsuits-re-cambodia (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) (discussing the provincial court complaint filed
against Koh Kong Plantation and Koh Kong Sugar Industry in Cambodia by 4,000 villagers).
Oxfam estimates 22,500 people were evicted between 2004 and 2010 following the granting of
licenses by the Ugandan National Forestry Authority. See also MATT GRAINGER & KATE GEARY,
THE NEW FORESTS COMPANY AND ITS UGANDA PLANTATIONS, OXFAM CASE STUDY 2 (Sept.
2011) (outlining instances where individuals have been displaced as a result of these licenses. The
authors note that Francis, once a model farmer who is now “‘one of the poorest’ . . . . is among
more than twenty thousand people who have been evicted from their homes and land in Kiboga
district, and in nearby Mubende district, to make way for NFC plantations.”).
34. Land governance regimes, and tenure rights within them, are quite context-specific. But in
general, when land is deemed to be public or state land, the government has the right to decide
how to use or allocate such land. This means that, although there may be individuals or
communities who rely on such land for their livelihood strategies, the government may not need
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the other hand, even when land is provided directly by communities or
individuals, grievances regarding displacement may arise: for example,
when communal land was provided without the support of all
community members, or when individuals were intimidated into
providing rights to use their land. Under either scenario, displacement
can reduce food security and negatively affect well-being, particularly
when compensation is inadequate.35
The case of U.S.-based Herakles Capital’s investment in South-West
Cameroon, which centered on a concession for over 73,000 hectares of
oil palm plantations,36 illustrates the multiple types of grievances that
can arise from a single project. Allies of communities affected by the
project claimed that meaningful consultation processes had not taken
place, and argued that the FPIC of each affected community had not
been obtained, as the agreement of certain traditional authorities and
elders alone, without participation of the broader community, fell far
short of the FPIC standard.37 It was further alleged that the project
would lead to the loss of lands and resources on which local
to technically acquire that land from them. In contexts where land is not deemed to be owned or
controlled by the government, a government may decide to acquire land—on a voluntary or
compulsory basis, and within the boundaries of what is permitted under domestic law—for
investments. It may do this preemptively or for specific projects; the latter scenario is more
comparable to how the government of the United States, for example, has used its power of
eminent domain.
35. One example of this comes from Uganda, where a British company’s investment in timber
plantations allegedly led to the evictions of thousands of local community members. LAND AND
POWER: THE GROWING SCANDAL SURROUNDING THE NEW WAVE OF INVESTMENTS IN LAND,
151 OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER (Sept. 22, 2011). Those community members sought redress
through both judicial and non-judicial means, including in the lodging of a complaint with the
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation. In that complaint, the
communities noted that, “[a]s a result of this physical and economic displacement, the affected
communities’ livelihoods have been significantly impaired. In particular, and due especially to
decreased productive and income-earning potential, many families report . . . eating materially
less well.” Letter from Barbara Stockin, Chief Exec., Oxfam GB & Jeremy Hobbs, Exec. Dir.,
Oxfam Int’l, to Meg Taylor, Compliance Adviser/Ombudsman, Int’l Fin. Corp. (Dec. 20, 2011)
(on file with authors) (regarding New Forests Company, Namwasa Plantation; IFC financing via
Agri-Vie Fund PCC).
36. Sustainable Oils Cameroon, supra note 22.
37. ANALYSIS OF SOME CONTESTED LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING THE HERAKLES
FARMS/SGSOC’S OIL PALM PLANTATION PROJECT IN CAMEROON, THE LAND AND
INVESTMENTS GROUP – SCIENCES PO LAW CLINIC § 4.3 (last viewed Aug. 22, 2017) [hereinafter
SCIENCES PO]. While FPIC is a right reserved primarily for indigenous and tribal peoples under
international human rights law, it is also required to be applied to all local peoples and
communities under the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’s Principles & Criteria.
ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE PALM
OIL
PRODUCTION
(Oct.
2007),
http://www.rspo.org/file/RSPO%20Principles%20&%20Criteria%20Document.pdf (this 2007
version was the version at issue). Herakles was a member of the RSPO until withdrawing in
August 2012 while embroiled in an RSPO complaints process.
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communities relied for their livelihood,38 increasing their risk of
indirect or economic displacement. Predicted negative effects on the
environment included the clearing of forests, reduction of biodiversity,
and increased release of greenhouse gases.39 In addition, local activists
and organizations focusing on the project’s potential impacts on human
rights and the environment asserted that they had experienced
“intimidation, lawsuits, arrests, and violent attacks.”40 Two
Cameroonian NGOs also alleged illegal activity by the company’s
Cameroonian subsidiary, including “intimidation and bribery of
community leaders, government officials, and local citizens . . . to gain
land.”41
2. Responding to Land Grievances: Incentives and Challenges
Host governments and investors may have various incentives for
addressing land grievances. Grievances have triggered protests,
litigation, international advocacy campaigns, and violent conflict, all of
which can create reputational, financial, operational, and legal risks.
Governments and investors that work to address land grievances as they
arise have a better chance of mitigating, rather than exacerbating, these
risks.
Yet despite the compelling reasons to take remedial action,
governments and investors alike can find it difficult to rectify land
grievances in practice. In some instances, there may be no way to fully
remedy certain actions, such as when a sacred site has been destroyed.42
At other times, community disagreement on the appropriate remedies
may entrench local opposition to any proposed remedial efforts.
Additionally, internal disagreements within a government or the
investing company may create obstacles that block effective efforts to
address grievances. In addition, either a government or an investor
might find that the other side is uninterested in addressing grievances.
38. GREENPEACE, HERAKLES FARMS IN CAMEROON: A SHOWCASE IN BAD PALM OIL
PRODUCTION 5, 13 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter GREENPEACE]; SCIENCES PO, supra note 37, at § 4.6.
39. GREENPEACE, supra note 38, at 5.
40. Cameroon Activists on Trial for Peaceful Protest Against Wall Street Land Grabber,
GRAIN (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4879-cameroon-activists-on-trial-forpeaceful-protest-against-wall-street-land-grabber.
41. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. NAT’L CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERS., Final Statement, Specific Instance Between the Center for
Environment and Development (CED) with Network to Fight Against Hunger (RELUFA) and
Herakles Farms’ Affiliate SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC) in Cameroon (July 28, 2015).
42. See, e.g., Rubber Barons, GLOBAL WITNESS 16 (May 13, 2013),
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/rubberbarons/ (explaining that “[i]n three
villages near Hoang Anh Oyadav, Heng Brother and CRD’s rubber concessions, village chiefs
and elders described how the companies had destroyed spirit forest sites and burial grounds”).
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While challenging from either perspective, a government might find
itself in the particularly unenviable position of trying to placate its
citizens as well as the investor.
Another potential complication concerns the attitude and actions of
the investor’s home government. A supportive home government may
attempt to pressure the host government to act favorably toward its
outward investor, potentially rendering actions to address grievances at
the expense of the investor even more unpalatable to the host
government. For instance, in the aforementioned example from
Cameroon, the home state of Herakles Capital—the United States—
privately urged the Cameroonian government to resolve disputes
regarding the plantation, with a high-level U.S. official reportedly
advising Cameroon to “act quickly” to “avoid arbitration or protracted
legal proceedings.”43 This official also reportedly warned that a failure
to act could have “a chilling effect on future foreign investment.” 44 This
allusion to arbitration and legal proceedings provides an example of
how the threat of international investment law may loom over
governmental efforts to redress land grievances. This may be so even if
the host government also has legal obligations under international
human rights law to restitute land allocated to an investor or to take
other actions to provide redress to aggrieved community members. The
web of international, domestic, and contractual legal obligations
relevant to governments, and the challenges that arise at the intersection
of these legal frameworks, are discussed below.
II. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS, REDRESS MECHANISMS, AND CHALLENGES OF
INTERSECTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
A government’s legal obligations may influence its approach to
addressing land grievances. This Section discusses the obligations and
43. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable that was accessed through a Freedom of Information
Act request, when a high-level U.S. official visited Cameroon, the official raised the topic of
ongoing disputes related to the plantation, including a stop work order issued by the Minister of
Forests and Wildlife. The cable notes that the official:
[U]rged the Prime Minister to make a decision and take action to resolve the dispute. She
told [the Prime Minister] that the United States does not want to tell Cameroon what
decision to make, but Cameroon should act quickly and avoid arbitration or protracted legal
proceedings. She warned that a failure to act could cause uncertainty in the local business
climate and have a chilling effect on future foreign investment.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COMMERCIAL ISSUES DOMINATE DAS AKUTETEHS CAMEROON VISIT,
DOC.
NO.
CO5446286
(May
31,
2013),
https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/us-embassy-cables-heraklesfarms-130531.pdf.
44. Id. (noting, additionally, that “a failure to act could cause uncertainty in the local business
climate”).
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remedies found in three particularly relevant sources: international
investment law, international human rights law, and investor-state
contracts. It also considers some of the challenges arising at the
interface of these legal frameworks.
A. International Investment Law
International investment law is a rapidly developing area of law
regulating governments’ treatment of foreign investors—with
significant implications for governments as they seek to handle
grievances arising from investments in land. International investment
law’s remedial mechanisms render it relatively powerful: most, though
not all, of the more than 3,000 existing investment treaties provide
foreign investors with a direct private right of action to sue their host
governments in international arbitration.45 These investor-state dispute
settlement (“ISDS”) proceedings, which are typically determined by a
panel of three arbitrators, do not generally require exhaustion of
domestic remedies.46
Monetary damages awarded by arbitrators for violations of the
applicable investment treaty may cover both past losses and lost future
profits. Some awards have been for staggering sums, both as an absolute
number and as a proportion of government expenditures.47 Even
governments that ultimately prevail in an arbitration may be forced to
expend significant time and resources in defending the claim,48 and may
45. As of December 15, 2017, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) had “mapped’ 2,573 investment treaties. Of those 2,573 treaties, UNCTAD found
that 2,442 provided for investor-state dispute settlement. That information is available at
UNCTAD’s website http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/.
46. For an overview of investor-state disputes, see JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES 392–435 (Oxford Int’l Law Library, 2d ed. 2015); M. SORNARAJAH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 172–235 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2010).
47. As noted by Lauge Poulsen, a 2003 award against the Czech Republic for USD $350
million damages was:
[E]qual to the entire health budget of the Czech government and effectively doubled the
public-sector deficit for the year. Nine years later a split tribunal awarded an American
company $2.37 billion [USD] in compensation from Ecuador including interest . . . The
award amounted to almost 7 per cent of the Ecuadorian government’s total government
budget and, adjusted for GDP, an equivalent award against the United Kingdom would be
almost $70 billion [USD] and for the United States $458 billion [USD].
LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: THE
POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (Cambridge Univ. Press,
2015). The award against Ecuador was subsequently reduced on annulment, due to the fact that
the claimants did not own 100 percent of the investment, but had been ordered damages
corresponding to 100 percent of the value of the investment. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. The
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Annulment of the Award, ¶¶
136–302, 585–86 (Nov. 2, 2015).
48. Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL
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not be able to recoup those costs even if they are successful in their
defense.49 Governments concerned about arbitration claims50 may thus
be wary of addressing land grievances in a way that interferes with an
investment, even in circumstances in which the public interest would
justify or even require such interference.
International investment treaties commonly contain a core set of
obligations regulating governments’ conduct. These include: obligations
not to treat foreign investors less favorably than domestic investors (the
“national treatment” obligation) or less favorably than foreign investors
from another state (the “most-favored nation treatment” obligation); the
obligation to provide foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment;”
the obligation to provide foreign investors “full protection and
security;” the obligation to ensure any expropriation is accompanied by
payment of compensation; and the obligation to adhere to any
commitment entered into with or owed to foreign investors (the
“umbrella clause”).51
Investment arbitration tribunals have interpreted these obligations
differently, and are not bound by precedent. Combined with the varied
and oft-vague language used in treaties, it is difficult to declare
definitively what any one obligation requires.
ARBITRATION REVIEW (Mar. 24, 2014), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32513/.
49. Id. (discussing rules on allocation of costs, and finding that states who are found not liable
for breaching the treaty may nevertheless be required to bear their legal costs as well as at least a
portion of costs of the arbitration); see also Memorandum from Iván Zarak A., Acting Minister of
Econ. & Fin. to Meg Kinnear, Secretary-General, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes (Sept.
12, 2016) (discussing problems that those states that have received cost awards from tribunals
have faced when seeking to enforce cost awards against judgment-proof claimants).
50. Conversely, governments may also be caught off-guard by the relevance of investment
treaties, as investment arbitration tribunals have taken a relatively permissive approach toward
allowing companies to structure or restructure their holdings so as to gain treaty protection, and to
use parent or intermediate companies to secure treaty coverage for their investments. Gold
Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶¶ 248–
72 (Sept. 22, 2014); Saluka Invs. BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶¶ 239–42
(UNCITRAL Arb. Mar. 17, 2006). Some investment arbitration tribunals have even permitted
nationals of the host state to obtain treaty protection by “roundtripping”—i.e., establishing a
corporate entity in a foreign country and routing investments from the host state through the
foreign entity back to the host state. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 29, 2004). In addition, some tribunals have determined that even
indirect and minority non-controlling shareholders can initiate arbitrations, potentially exposing
the government to multiple suits arising out of the same underlying issue. See, e.g., TECO Guat.
Holdings LLC v. The Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, ¶ 79 (Dec. 19,
2013) (finding that the electricity company which holds an indirect share may initiate arbitration);
Iberdrola Energía S.A. v. La Republica de Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, Award, ¶ 278 (Aug.
17, 2012) (discussing the claims of an indirect shareholder).
51. For overviews of these treaty standards, see SALACUSE, supra note 46, at 422 (discussing
the incorporation of arbitration into treaties); SORNARAJAH, supra, note 46, at 183–87 (discussing
reasons for making bilateral investment treaties).
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For example, the non-discrimination provisions have been interpreted
to prohibit de jure discrimination against foreign investors on account of
the investors’ nationality, as well as de facto discrimination.52 While
different treatment of differently situated or “unlike” investors is
permitted,53 the test for determining “likeness” is not clear. Indeed, the
outcome in a dispute may depend on the intensity with which a tribunal
decides to scrutinize governments’ decisions to distinguish between
investors.54 The role of intent and nationality is also disputed: Some
tribunals have found that a government’s different treatment of
investors or investments––though not based on or a result of the
investors’ nationality––may also be unjustified, unreasonable, or
illegitimate.55
The fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) obligation is another core
obligation that has been interpreted in divergent ways. The FET
obligation may be considered the most extensive obligation in terms of
the range of duties that it has been interpreted to impose on states 56 and
52. See, e.g., Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. 2009–04, ¶¶ 685–731 (Mar. 17, 2015)
(finding that the government of Canada discriminated against the foreign investors and their
investment by treating their proposed mining project less favorably than other mining projects,
but declining to conclude that the adverse treatment was due to the investors’ foreign nationality).
53. See Freya Baetens, Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: Determining Likeness in
Human Rights and Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE
PUBLIC LAW 279 (Stephen Schill ed., 2010) (discussing different treatment bases for different
nations); Jurgen Kurtz, The Merits and Limits of Comparativism: National Treatment in
International Investment Law and the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 243 (Stephen Schill ed., 2010) (discussing comparativism in
treatment of parties).
54. Compare Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case
No. UN3467, Award, ¶¶ 167–77 (July 1, 2004) (investors in the business of growing and
exporting flowers were “like” investors engaged in extracting and exporting oil, and therefore did
not warrant different treatment under the country’s value-added tax system), with ParkeringsCompagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 375–97 (Sept. 11,
2007) (two investors seeking a government concession for the same investment activity were not
“like” due to the fact that their respective projects had different potential impacts in the host
community).
55. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 78
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 10, 2001) (differences in treatment will presumptively violate Article
1102(2), unless they have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not
distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and (2) do
not otherwise unduly undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA); Feldman v.
Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶¶ 183–84 (Dec. 16, 2002) (holding that the
distinction between citizenship and nationality is irrelevant to the interim decision); Clayton, PCA
Case No. 2009–04, ¶¶ 723–24.
56. In addition to contentions that the FET standard protects “legitimate expectations,”
commentators have asserted that it also imposes duties of good faith, transparency, nonarbitrariness, procedural and substantive due process, legality under domestic law, consistency,
and proportionality. See, e.g., Cervin Investissements S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/2, Final Award, ¶¶ 460–71 (Mar. 7, 2017) (holding that granting a “fair and equitable
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the frequency with which tribunals have found a violation.57
At present, there are two main approaches to understanding the FET
obligation.58 Under one approach, the FET standard embodies the
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law: a
floor of conduct below which no state is allowed to fall, identified
through an assessment of state practice and opinio juris. Under the other
approach, the FET standard is an “autonomous” standard of treatment:
not tethered to the minimum standard of treatment, but rather a more
nebulous standard based on a tribunal’s interpretation of the treaty.59
This autonomous standard, which is more commonly applied, has been
interpreted as embodying a range of requirements that may go well
beyond the norms of customary international law and is more likely to
result in state liability than the standard tied to customary international
law.60
Under this standard, the FET obligation has been interpreted to place
a number of requirements on states, from protecting an investor’s
“legitimate expectations” formed in reliance on the government’s
explicit assurances or implicit conduct61 to maintaining the “stability”
treatment” implies that the parties conduct themselves according to justice, reason, and equity
with respect to investments and income of investors); TECO Guat. Holdings LLC v. The
Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, ¶¶ 443–65 (Dec. 19, 2013) (determining
that if the claimant proves that the other party acted arbitrarily and with willful disregard of the
applicable framework, this behavior would constitute a breach of the minimum standard); MTD
Equity v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 89 (May 25, 2004) (explaining
that a party’s responsibility is limited to the consequences of its own actions to the extent that
they breached the obligation to treat the other party fairly and equitably).
57. Data indicate that of the cases for which information about investor claims is known, 80
percent involved FET claims (341 out of 425 cases); additionally, of the cases decided against
investors on known grounds, 65 percent involved a finding that the state breached the FET
obligation (eighty-four cases decided against investors on known grounds). This data is based on
a search of UNCTAD’s database on December 14, 2015. The database is available at
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches. Updated data regarding the total
number of cases in the database, the total number in which FET claims were brought, and the
total number cases in which FET violations were found can all be found on that page.
58. Some commentators and tribunals differ on whether and to what extent these two
approaches are actually distinct. One notion that has been argued by investors and accepted by
some tribunals is that there remains little difference in practice between the two standards, as the
two have converged over time through the minimum standard of treatment evolving and rising to
meet the “autonomous” FET obligation.
59. See David Gaukrodger, Addressing the Balance of Interests in Investment Treaties: The
Limitation of Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions to the Minimum Standard of Treatment
under Customary International Law 6 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv. 2017/03, 2017)
(addressing fair and equitable treatment provisions in investment treaties).
60. Id. at 10–13.
61. See, e.g., Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶¶ 570–76 (Sept. 22, 2014); see also Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. The
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on the Remaining Issues of
Jurisdiction and on Liability, ¶ 560 (Sept. 12, 2014); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi
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of the legal and economic environment.62 While the words “fair and
equitable” may therefore appear innocuous, the ways in which they
have been interpreted by tribunals may raise significant concerns for
governments seeking to address potential or actual grievances
surrounding large-scale investments in land. In particular, the FET
obligation can result in liability for government actions that impact
performance of existing concessions, as well as affect the nature and
scope of investor rights related to a concession.
For example, some investment arbitration tribunals have effectively
allowed investors to transform their “legitimate expectations” about
concessions or other investments into enforceable property rights, even
if such rights do not exist under domestic law. One example is found in
the case of Awdi v. Romania,63 which centered on two decisions by the
Constitutional Court of Romania finding that property rights claimed by
the investors were invalid.64 The Court’s first decision had invalidated
the investors’ title to contested property (on the ground that the
government had wrongfully expropriated the land from its previous
owners in 1950 and therefore never possessed valid title that could have
been transferred to the investors when the government subsequently
sought to privatize that property); the second had found unconstitutional
a national law granting the investors a forty-nine-year concession for
lands rented from various local governments. In a subsequent action
brought by the investors against Romania under an investment treaty,
the arbitration tribunal did not find fault with the Constitutional Court’s
process or decisions. Nevertheless, the tribunal determined that the
investors’ legitimate expectations had been breached and must be
compensated.65 In this way, the Constitutional Court’s authoritative
determination over the validity of the property rights under domestic
law led to a breach of the government’s FET obligation.
These and other obligations flowing from investment treaties have
ramifications for the governance of land-based investments and
A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶¶ 178–79 (Aug. 27,
2009).
62. See, e.g., PSEG Glob. Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶¶
250–55 (Jan. 19, 2007) (discussing the need for a stable business environment in which investors
can safely operate); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 274 (May 12, 2005) (“There can be no doubt, therefore, that a stable legal
and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment.”); Occidental
Expl. & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN3467, Final Award, ¶ 183 (London
Ct. of Int’l Arb. 2004) (discussing stability in the same vein).
63. Awdi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, (Mar. 2, 2015).
64. Id. at ¶ 327.
65. Id. at ¶ 532.
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governments’ options for addressing related grievances. And yet, it is
likely inappropriate for host states to seek to shape their conduct in a
way that fully avoids all potential investment treaty risks. Risks of
liability tied to investment treaty obligations should not, for example,
discourage good faith actions designed to comply with human rights
obligations. Whether and how international investment law can better
accommodate public interest objectives and human rights obligations
remains an issue ripe for continued interrogation.
B. International Human Rights Law
Whereas international investment law obligates governments to
protect investors in certain situations, international human rights law
sets out fundamental protections for individuals and peoples, including
those who risk being negatively affected by investments.66
The sources of human rights law are less fragmented than those of
international investment law: There are fewer than a dozen core human
rights treaties at the international level,67 supplemented by other
relevant multilateral treaties (such as International Labour Organisation
Conventions)68 and regional human rights treaties in Africa, the
Americas, and Europe. Human rights redress mechanisms are also
provided through more established fora, including regional human
rights courts, regional human rights commissions, and complaints
mechanisms tied to specific treaties.
These human rights redress mechanisms differ from investment
arbitration processes in ways that arguably lead to stronger avenues of
redress for investors than for individuals whose human rights have been
violated. For instance, human rights fora generally require claimants to
first exhaust available domestic remedies, which is usually not required
66. In some cases, investors have also sought protections under human rights law related to
the right to property. See, e.g., Rosenzweig & Bonded Warehouses Ltd. v. Pol., Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 51728/99, Judgment, ¶ 48 (July 28, 2005) (discussing the importance of balancing “the
individual’s fundamental rights”); Zlinsat Spol. S.R.O. v. Bulg., Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
57785/00, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Jan. 10, 2008) (discussing minimum protections “to which individuals
and legal entities were entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society”).
67. The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their Monitoring Bodies, U.N.
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx. (last visited Nov. 27,
2017).
68. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 27, June 27, 1989, ILO Convention 169, 1650
U.N.T.S. 383 (particularly relevant for land grievances, as it sets out legally binding requirements
for States Parties regarding free, prior and informed consent). In addition, all International Labour
Organization member states are required to comply with the rights set out in the ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
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for investment arbitration proceedings. In addition, investment
arbitration decisions are relatively easy to enforce in courts around the
world.69
States that have ratified human rights treaties have obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights codified therein.70 They
thus must refrain from violating those rights, prevent third parties from
violating those rights, and take steps to facilitate the enjoyment of those
rights.71 Soft law instruments, such as UN declarations and widely
endorsed guidelines, help in interpreting human rights law contained in
binding treaties.72
While land-based investment can affect a range of human rights, the
rights most commonly affected can be loosely grouped into three
categories: human rights tied to land occupation and use; other human
rights at risk for those living on, near, or downstream from concession
areas; and human rights of employees and contractors. The specific
rights falling into these three categories include: the right to property;
the right to FPIC; the prohibition of forced eviction; the rights to
housing, water, food, health, and a healthy environment; the right to
self-determination; the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression; the rights to life and to liberty and security of person; and
the right to just and favorable conditions of work, as well as the rights to
form and join trade unions and to freedom of association.73
69. Ease of enforcement results from two treaties. See Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. These two agreements bind States Parties to
recognize, enforce, and comply with arbitral awards, except under limited conditions.
70. Human rights instruments create binding obligations for states that have ratified them.
States that have signed a treaty but not yet ratified it are prohibited from taking steps to
undermine rights set out in the treaty. In addition, some human rights are considered to be binding
under customary international law, and therefore bind states regardless of whether or not they
have ratified a treaty setting out such rights.
71. International Human Rights Law, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited
Nov. 28, 2017).
72. While scholars’ perspectives vary, soft law is generally considered to be quasi-legal rules
that do not constitute legally binding obligations. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L.
Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172–74 (2010) (setting forth
explanations for soft law as more broadly described than before).
73. Most of these human rights are explicitly protected in different binding human rights
instruments. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. No. 95-19,
6 I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1967). A few of the specific human rights listed above have been
authoritatively interpreted to exist based on legally binding instruments: for example, the right to
water and the prohibition against forced evictions. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm.
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Government obligations related to these rights also have important
implications for how governments address land grievances. Grievances
arising from land-based investments frequently involve failures of the
government to respect or protect certain rights. Efforts to redress those
grievances should thus be done in a rights-compliant manner to ensure
that the government meets its legal obligations under human rights law.
C. Investor-State Contracts
Apart from the legal obligations established by international
investment law and by international human rights law, governments also
have legal obligations that they assume vis-à-vis specific investors in
the form of contracts with those investors.74 Investor-state contracts are
often used in countries where the government sells, leases, or otherwise
grants access to land for agriculture or forestry projects. These contracts
delineate a range of rights and obligations incumbent on both the
government and the investor. When used, such contracts are one of the
most important sources of governmental legal obligations related to a
land-based investment.
Investor-state contracts differ in their complexity, as well as in their
purported comprehensiveness. Some contracts, for example, explicitly
note that the investor must receive additional permits or approvals,
while others may endeavor to settle all relevant issues related to the
underlying project, including by obligating the government to ensure
that any requisite authorizations are provided as needed.75
One of the more contentious types of provisions included in some
investor-state contracts is the stabilization clause, which addresses how
changes in the law of the host state will affect the contract. Broad
stabilization clauses may aim to apply to all domestic laws; more
On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions, U.N. Doc.
E/1998/22 (May 20, 1997).
74. Investor-state contracts are completely separate from international investment treaties.
Whereas investment treaties are agreements between governments that govern protection of
covered investors and investments operating in the jurisdictions of the treaties’ parties, investorstate contracts are simply agreements between a government and an investor that specifically
allocate rights and risks between those contracting parties, generally in the context of a specific
investment project.
75. See, e.g., Sustainable Oils Cameroon, supra note 22, at art. 4, § 4.11(c) (freezing the list of
authorizations needed, noting that they shall be provided without payments, and stating that the
“Government undertakes to promptly provide to Investor, and to cause any Governmental
Authority to provide to Investor all certificates, exemptions, waivers, consents, licenses, permits,
easements, documents and other authorizations, to the extent any of the foregoing are or may be
desirable or necessary. . . ”).
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narrow ones are drafted to apply only to certain topics (for example, tax
laws).76 Some stabilization clauses seek to essentially “freeze” the law
in effect on the day the contract is signed, while others seek to ensure
“economic equilibrium” by obligating the government to compensate
the investor for losses incurred in complying with new laws. 77 Still
other stabilization clauses aim for a combination of both objectives. 78
Given that stabilization clauses can potentially affect applicability of
domestic laws protecting human rights, labor rights, or the environment,
they are generally discouraged.79
Investor-state contracts frequently cover the process to be used in
addressing disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract.
Many provide for commercial arbitration under the same or similar rules
that govern arbitration arising out of investment treaties. As with
investment arbitration, these commercial arbitrations often occur outside
of the host country.80 Even when an international investor has
incorporated an entity in the jurisdiction in which it is investing, the
contract may still assert that it is to be considered a foreign investor for
76. Guide to Land Contracts: Forestry Projects, INT’L SENIOR LAWYERS PROJECT 26–27
(Jan. 2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/01/GuidetoLandContracts-ForestryProjects.pdf.
77. Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights, INT’L FIN. CORP. 19–26 (May
27,
2009),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabilization%2BPa
per.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
78. Id. at 26–28.
79. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 19, 21–
22 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf. See also Principles for Responsible
Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract
Negotiations, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R 15–19 (Principle 4) (2015)
[hereinafter U.N. Responsible Contracts] (discussing the risks that stabilization clauses pose for
states seeking to meet their human rights obligations, and noting that, if used, the contracts should
be carefully drafted to ensure that the state remains able to meet its obligations under human
rights law).
80. A number of publicly available investor-state contracts relating to investments in land and
agriculture illustrate this practice. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov’t of
The Republic of Sierra Leone & Sierra Land Dev. Ltd., art. 8(i) (Apr. 25, 2014),
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2317427356/view#/pdf (providing that
“[a]ll [d]isputes shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in London”); Sub-lease
Between Dr. Joseph Sam Sesay & Socfin Agric. Co. Ltd., art. 5.2 (a) (Mar. 5, 2011),
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2434433566/view#/pdf (including in the
contract that “all disputes shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in London before
three arbitrators”); Concession Agreement Between the Gov’t of Liber. & the Md. Oil Palm
Plantation, §§ 26.2–26.3 (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf5085611127/view#/pdf (providing that any disputes are to be resolved by arbitration in London
and administered by the London Court of International Arbitration); Inv. Agreement Between The
Republic of Liber. & Liber. Forest Prods. Inc., § 24.6 (May 22, 2008)
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-0122591393/view#/pdf (providing for
arbitration of disputes arising under the contract and specifying that such arbitrations are to take
place in Washington, D.C., “or such other place as the Parties may agree”).
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the purposes of any disputes related to the investment.81
In general, investor-state contracts are subordinate to domestic law.
However, as discussed in the following Section, contractual provisions
and investment treaties may work to shield investors from having to
comply with aspects of the domestic law.
D. Challenges of Intersecting Legal Frameworks
A government’s obligations under these distinct legal frameworks
and agreements interact in complicated ways. At times, some
obligations may reinforce or elevate other obligations; conversely,
obligations may be in tension or may even be in conflict. To date,
international tribunals (in both the investment and the human rights
regimes) have not provided clear guidance to governments on how to
deal with potentially conflicting obligations. In light of the stronger
enforceability mechanisms found in international investment law, these
interactions between legal obligations may complicate a government’s
interest in or ability to comply with its human rights obligations—or to
address its citizens’ grievances arising from land investments.
Understanding how some of these obligations may reinforce or
elevate other obligations is key to the argument this Article sets out in
Part IV. The most dramatic example is the potential for international
investment law, as it has been applied by tribunals, to elevate to a
supranational level a state’s contractual and quasi-contractual
commitments (such as those made in an investor-state contract or
through a government official’s separate representations to an investor).
How is this possible? Contracts, including those signed by a
government, are generally subordinate to domestic law. They provide a
specific set of governance rules, and allocate rights and obligations
between parties, for a specific arrangement that is otherwise governed
by domestic law. They can help to fill gaps in domestic law. They can
even strive to modify or circumvent application of domestic law as
applied to a specific project—for example, through the provision of
special fiscal arrangements, through the imposition of specialized rules
on available remedies, or with the use of stabilization clauses, as
discussed above. Yet whether such attempts to modify or circumvent
81. See, e.g., Act Ratifying the Concession Agreement Between The Republic of Liber. &
LIBINC Oil Palm Inc., § 24.3 (May 22, 2008), http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds591adf-6459881214/view#/ (“Notwithstanding the incorporation in Liberia of LIBINCO,
LIBINCO shall be treated as a Person that is a national of the United States of America for
purposes of the Convention and of this Agreement.”). At the time the contract was ratified, the
company was a wholly owned subsidiary of Equatorial Palm Oil, PLC, which is a UK publicly
listed company.
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domestic law are acceptable, and even whether a contract in its entirety
is legitimate, traditionally depends on the domestic law governing the
contract. For example, a contract that seeks to stabilize certain aspects
of applicable law may be permissible in some jurisdictions. In other
jurisdictions, a court might determine that a stabilization clause is
invalid and unenforceable in light of the domestic legal framework—for
example, if the clause would improperly restrict governmental power to
act in the public interest.82
Yet, investment treaties mean that the governing domestic legal
system may not be the only, or the last, system to interpret the validity
of an investor-state contract, or aspects of it. Regardless of how a
contract might be interpreted by an applicable domestic court, an
investment arbitration tribunal interpreting an investor-state contract
might adopt a different view. A tribunal could, for example, hold that
promises made under (or even outside of) the contract that would not be
binding or enforceable under domestic law are nevertheless valid and
must be enforced under the investment treaty’s umbrella clause and/or
in light of the government’s FET or expropriation obligations. In this
way, international investment law can elevate contractual obligations
above domestic law. This is in stark contrast to the traditional legal
hierarchy, in which contracts are subordinate to domestic law.
The effect of elevating contracts to a supranational level extends
beyond the protection of particular contractual provisions that might
otherwise be deemed invalid under domestic law. According to some
arbitral tribunal decisions, it can also cover statements and promises that
did not make their way into the contract, and can also potentially protect
an entire contract that might have been found illegal or unenforceable.83
Such outcomes are unlikely when the illegality is severe. For example,
some investment arbitration tribunals have found that they cannot hear
claims regarding contracts secured through fraud or corruption.84 Yet
tribunals have proved willing to accept cases in which contracts are
illegal for other reasons, such as when the government signatory was
not authorized to sign, or when the contractual process did not comply
with domestic legal requirements.85
82. See Shemberg, supra note 77, at 33 (noting the clauses are generally not enforceable in
common law countries, and difficult to enforce in civil law systems); see also, e.g., David Dana &
Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 485 (1999)
(discussing some issues of enforceability in United States law).
83. See cases cited infra note 154 (providing examples of cases that protect investors’ interests
despite potential illegality contrary to host countries’ laws).
84. See cases cited infra note 169 (providing examples of cases where tribunals have found
contracts unenforceable for violating international public policy).
85. See, e.g., Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Geor., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 &
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The web of legal obligations that bind governments may also produce
obligations that are in tension and that, in particular circumstances,
conflict with one another. While no inherent conflict necessarily exists
between, for example, international investment law and international
human rights law, these distinct legal regimes and how they are applied
can, in specific situations, create the potential that actions taken by a
state to address one set of stakeholders’ rights or interests may lead to
liability for harming another set of stakeholders’ rights or interests.
Actions to protect human rights may violate investor protections under a
treaty or an investor’s rights under a contract; similarly, actions to
protect investments may violate human rights.
Consider, for example, an investor with contract rights to a land
concession and investment treaty protections, and whose operations, or
mere presence, are being challenged by a local community as infringing
on their own rights. Perhaps the local community has lost access to land
over which it had traditional or customary rights, protected under
international law. The government may have a legal obligation under
international human rights law to restitute that land to the community.
Doing so, however, could infringe on the investor’s own rights under
the contract or investment treaty.86 Failure to do so might constitute a
continuing violation of the community’s human rights. This scenario is
not too unlike the case described below, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay.87
Any scenario in which a government’s obligations toward an investor
might directly conflict with its obligations under human rights law
raises an obvious question, but one that is often the elephant in the room
that no one wishes to speak of: Isn’t this situation the fault of the
government? In other words, if a government was already complying
ARB/07/15, Award, ¶ 273 (Mar. 3, 2010) (finding concession in violation of Georgian law still
valid because agreements “cloaked with the mantle of Governmental authority”); R.R. Dev. Corp.
v. Republic of Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 235 (June 29, 2012) (finding
“grossly unfair” the attempt to exact concessions from a party who reasonably relied on
governmental representations).
86. Of course, international investment law does not completely tie the hands of
government—indeed, treaties generally allow expropriation of property so long as it is coupled
with just compensation. Yet the potential complications flowing from such an action can be
daunting—an investor that disagrees with the expropriation process or amount of compensation,
for example, could lodge claims under multiple standards, including regarding its “expectations”
regarding performance of the contract, and whether the expropriation of the investor’s property
was lawful, placing the government at risk of being found in breach of a treaty for actions
undertaken to rectify human rights violations. Such a scenario can be further complicated when a
government and investor disagree about the nature or even existence of the investor’s rights.
87. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Para, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006).
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with its human rights obligations, then it would only accept or allow
investments that are rights-compliant. And rights-compliant investments
would not create scenarios in which a government would have to
infringe on the investor’s rights in order to protect human rights. Under
this line of reasoning, arguments that a government must take actions
detrimental to the investor in order to comply with human rights are
viewed with suspicion, for if the government truly cared, would it not
have addressed human rights earlier?
Not necessarily. There are many reasons why a government might
find itself in such a scenario: a change to a more democratic or postconflict regime,88 a lack of clarity at the time an investment was
approved of the actual human rights impacts that would arise, or the
evolution of relevant norms by which the government seeks to abide,89
to name a few. More importantly, the particulars of how a government
arrived at such a crossroads do not absolve it of its obligations to protect
human rights.90 Nor does its track record of compliance with human
rights to date.91
In spite of the complicated interactions between legal obligations,
international courts and tribunals have not yet provided much assistance
in resolving potential conflicts between obligations arising from human
rights law and investment treaties. Rather, they have skewed toward
avoidance of any finding that a conflict exists or toward resolution of a
88. See generally Philippe Le Billon, Contract Renegotiation and Asset Recovery in PostConflict Settings, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL RESOURCES AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING
69 (P. Lujala & S.A. Rustad eds., 2012).
89. The international community, for example, has increasingly focused on legitimate tenure
rights, which may not be recognized under domestic law, but which ought to be protected by
governments. See generally VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF
TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY,
COMM. ON WORLD FOOD SEC. (2012). Some states have begun to undertake serious efforts to
implement these voluntary guidelines, which arguably have the status of soft law. Such efforts
include reforming laws and policies to recognize tenure claims to land that was previously
classified as public or state land—the type of land most likely to be conceded to investors.
90. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 24: State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, ¶ 13 (Aug. 10,
2017) (“States Parties cannot derogate from the obligations under the Covenant in trade and
investment treaties that they may conclude.”).
91. A separate question, not addressed in this Article, is whether the protections flowing from
an investment treaty are influenced by the investor’s compliance with its human rights
responsibilities. For example, can an investor have legitimate expectations that the government
would act contrary to its obligations under human rights law? For one argument that a state’s
human rights legal obligations are relevant for the determination of whether an investor’s
expectations are legitimate, see generally Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/21, Submission as an “Other Person” Pursuant to Article 836 and Annex 836.1
of the Peru–Canada FTA (June 9, 2016).

542

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 49

dispute based only on one set of legal obligations. This often means that
the outcome of a dispute where such tensions are at play depends on the
body deciding it. Although making pragmatic sense for the tribunal in
question, this approach leaves governments in limbo—caught between
conflicting obligations with no clear sense of how to square them.
In the human rights arena, one prominent exception whereby a
human rights body did seek to resolve potentially conflicting obligations
arising from investment law and human rights law is found in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights’ decision in Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay.92 That case concerned Paraguay’s
failure to resolve a legal claim lodged by the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community of the Enxet-Lengua people over the community’s ancestral
lands. The government had sold the land to foreign investors, who used
it to set up cattle ranches.93 While the community initially remained on
the land, members eventually moved, establishing temporary residence
by the side of a nearby road.94 In 1991, they filed a petition against the
Paraguayan government seeking recognition of the land as the
community’s ancestral land.
Paraguay argued, among other points, that the land had been bought
by a German national, who refused to sell the land so it could be
transferred to the community, and who was protected by a bilateral
agreement between Paraguay and Germany that ensured “the promotion
and reciprocal protection of capital investments from both countries.”95
The Court rejected that argument on procedural grounds, noting that the
treaty had not been provided to the Court for the purposes of the case.96
The Court proceeded, however, to provide two alternative justifications
for upholding the community’s rights to the land even in the context of
an applicable investment treaty.
Under the Court’s first alternative rationale, the investment treaty
allowed expropriation of capital investments where necessary for a
public purpose, and such a purpose could include the restitution of
ancestral land to an indigenous community. 97 Through this line of
argument, which did not include any detailed explanation of existing
jurisprudence regarding “public purpose,” the Court sought to
92. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146.
93. Id. at 16, 30.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 70.
96. Id. at 77.
97. Id. (“[S]aid convention allows for capital investments made by a contracting party to be
condemned or nationalized for a ‘public purpose or interest,’ which could justif[y] land restitution
to indigenous people.”).
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harmonize the commercial treaty with the American Convention on
Human Rights.98 This approach was also similar to the Court’s previous
ruling in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay that “restriction
of the right of private individuals to private property might be necessary
to attain the collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a
democratic and pluralist society.”99 Yet while the Court noted in Yakye
Axa that such a restriction could be proportional if fair compensation
was paid, it did not reiterate this in Sawhoyamaxa, leaving open the
question of whether fair compensation would be required when
expropriation is carried out to restore ancestral land ownership.
The Court’s second alternative rationale in Sawhoyamaxa for denying
the state’s investment treaty-based defense focused on the nature of the
investment treaty and of the American Convention. It concluded that the
enforcement of “bilateral commercial treaties . . . should always be
compatible with the American Convention, which is a multilateral treaty
on human rights that stands in a class of its own and that generates
rights for individual human beings and does not depend entirely on
reciprocity among States.”100 This reasoning implies that any
investment protection provision conflicting with rights protected by the
American Convention, or any other convention containing protections
of human rights with which the Court is seized, would need to be
interpreted in a way that avoids such a conflict.101
Such reasoning, grounded in an assertion of the primacy of human
98. Pedro Nikken, Balancing of Human Rights and Investment Law in the Inter-American
System of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
ARBITRATION 246, 260 (P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni & E.U. Petersmann eds., 2009).
99. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Para, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 148 (June 17, 2005).
100. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, at 77.
101. Following the 2006 judgment of the Inter-American Court, the Paraguayan government
was slow to implement the ruling. In 2008, the Court noted that few of its orders had been
complied with. In 2009, Paraguay’s Senate rejected a plan to expropriate the land. By January
2013, negotiations between the government and the community had commenced. In June 2013,
the Sawhoyamaxa unilaterally reoccupied part of the ancestral lands, and various civil society
organizations launched campaigns to create political pressure for a formal expropriation of the
land in question so it could be formally transferred to the Sawhoyamaxa. A law to expropriate the
land was approved by Congress and signed by the president in 2014. The ranchers then
challenged the decision to expropriate, but had their case rejected by the Supreme Court of
Paraguay in October 2014. Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,
ESCR-NET, https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2013/case-sawhoyamaxa-indigenous-communityv-paraguay (last visited Nov. 28, 2017); Paraguay: Senate Approves Expropriation Bill in Favour
of Sawhoyamaxa Community, IWGIA (May 5, 2014), https://www.iwgia.org/en/paraguay/2025paraguay-senate-approves-expropriation-bill-in-fav; David Hill, Paraguay’s Supreme Court
Issues ‘Historic’ Land Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2014, 8:13 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2014/oct/07/paraguay-supremecourt-historic-land-ruling.
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rights obligations, is perhaps unlikely to be widely adopted by
investment arbitration tribunals, as discussed below. Placing
international treaties in some form of hierarchy is not without its
critics,102 and past investment arbitration tribunals have rejected such an
approach.103 Nonetheless, the Sawhoyamaxa judgment signals that the
Inter-American Court, and potentially other human rights courts and
treaty bodies, may reject any defense supplied by a state that its
obligations under investment treaties (and, potentially, investor-state
contracts) prevent compliance with its human rights obligations. Even
when such obligations conflict, a human rights tribunal is likely to find
that the government’s obligations under human rights law remain and
must be met.104
The primacy of human rights obligations has also been underscored
recently in the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural

102. As one scholar wrote:
This reasoning, reflecting the idea that international human rights law is inherently
superior to other branches of international law, is rather weak. It is difficult to deny
that treaty commitments entered into by states have under international law the same
formal status and rank regardless of their subject matter. Moreover, even considering
that this argument may point to a possible development of international law, it is very
unlikely that any international tribunal other than a human rights court will be willing
to follow this line of reasoning.
Cesare Pitea, Right to Property, Investments and Environmental Protection: The Perspectives of
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMON CONCERNS, 265, 269 (Treves et al. eds., 2014)
This notion has been additionally discussed:
[H]uman rights are pervasive and perennially relevant in all adjudication, but not
necessarily superior. In this sense, the multiple legal sources available engage in a
dialogue, rather than opposition, and all cooperate towards achieving the best possible
result. Human rights are an essential consideration, but not one which automatically
trumps all other applicable rules.
Lucas Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:
Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 585, 591
(2010).
103. Suez v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶
262 (July 30, 2010) (“The Tribunal does not find a basis for such a conclusion either in the BITs
or international law. Argentina is subject to both international obligations . . . and must respect
both of them equally.”).
104. Indeed, there exists a draft legally binding instrument, which is currently being
elaborated by an open-ended intergovernmental working group under a mandate provided by the
U.N. Human Rights Council. See Elements for the Draft Legally Binding Instrument on
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights,
H.R.C.
Res.
A/HRC/RES/26/9,
¶
1.4
(Sept.
29,
2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/LegallyBindin
gInstrumentTNCs_OBEs.pdf (listing as one of the objectives, “[t]o reaffirm the primacy of
human rights law over trade and investments agreements and establish specific State obligations
in this regard”).
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Rights’ General Comment No. 24.105 The General Comment, which
constitutes an authoritative interpretation of governments’ binding
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, asserts that “States parties cannot derogate from the
obligations under the Covenant in trade and investment treaties that they
may conclude.”106 This has implications for the interpretation of
existing investment treaties as well as for the design of future ones, and
the General Comment notes that States Parties “are encouraged . . . to
ensure that mechanisms for the settlement of investor-State disputes
take human rights into account in the interpretation of investment
treaties or of investment chapters in trade agreements.”107
Ensuring that investor-state disputes adequately consider human
rights would require a shift from how most proceedings have been
undertaken to date. Detailed inquiries into potentially conflicting legal
obligations are also rare in investment arbitration. In multiple
investment arbitrations, the host state or amicus curiae have made
submissions asking that the state’s human rights obligations toward its
citizens be considered when assessing the scope of the state’s
obligations and potential liabilities to foreign investors. 108 Yet tribunals
have often dismissed such arguments without in-depth analysis.109
105. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 24: State Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in the Context of Business Activities, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017).
106. Id. at ¶ 13.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 109 (discussing arbitration cases that implicate human
rights arguments to varying degrees).
109. At the time of writing, the most significant treatment of the issue of human rights in
publicly available arbitral decisions occurred in Urbaser v. Argentina. That dispute is one of
several that arose out of private investment in water services in Argentina. In that case, the
tribunal largely addressed human rights arguments in the context of evaluating Argentina’s
counterclaim against the investor (as opposed to, as has been more common, addressing the issue
of human rights in the context of the investor’s alleged human rights or in the context of the
respondent state’s defense). The tribunal ultimately concluded that Argentina’s human rights
counterclaim failed. The tribunal, however, also included some discussion of the ways in which
states should reconcile their obligations under human rights and investment law. It stated:
Argentina had two kinds of obligations. These are its obligations regarding the
population’s right to water, and its obligations towards international investors. The
Argentine Republic can and should fulfil both kinds of obligations simultaneously. In
so doing, the obligations resulting from the human right to water do not operate as an
obstacle to the fulfilment of its obligations towards the Claimants. Nonetheless,
Claimants’ argument is too short. It does not resolve the conflict between the
obligation to guarantee the Concessionaire’s right under the Concession and the access
of the poor and vulnerable population to water when this cannot be ensured otherwise
than by failing to comply with the host State’s obligations toward the Concessionaire.
There is no need to open at this juncture the debate on whether foreign investors have,
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A perfunctory approach by investment arbitration tribunals raises the
risk that, in certain cases, arbitral decisions may limit the host
government’s ability to fully comply with its human rights
obligations.110 For instance, a large award ordered as compensation by
under international law, an obligation to contribute on their part to the provision of
drinking water to the extent this is required by the human right to water. It is entirely
sufficient to note that AGBA and its Concessionaire must have been aware that they
were indirectly bound by the fundamental right to water of the population of Region B
due to the provision ordering ORAB to take account in its decisions of the “protection
of the community’s interests” (Sec. 13-II of Law No. 11820), including the “protection
of the users’ interests,” which are a concern based on Section 4.3 of the Concession
Contract and in light of Article 42 of the Constitution.
Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶¶ 720–21 (Dec.
8, 2016). Many of the other cases raising human rights arguments have also centered around
claims against Argentina arising out of the impact on private concessionaires of its response to its
economic crisis. In defending those cases, one argument raised by Argentina and amicus curiae
was that the government’s measures were necessary in order to fulfill its obligations to guarantee
enjoyment of basic human rights threatened by potentially considerable increases in the costs of
essential public services. In these and other cases, tribunals have tended to avoid engaging with
human rights arguments. See, e.g., Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for
Annulment of the Award, ¶ 243 (Aug. 10, 2010) (noting that only the second decision on
annulment mentioned these issues, but did not discuss them); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v.
Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Amicus Curiae Submissions by the Canadian Union
of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, ¶¶ 26–37 (Oct. 20, 2005) (regarding human
rights issues raised by amicus curiae); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Amicus Curiae
Submissions of Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the Earth United States, ¶¶ 40–42
(NAFTA Chapter 11 Arb. Sept. 30, 2005) (regarding human rights issues raised by amicus
curiae); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Submission of Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater
Network, Communities for a Better Environment and Center for International Environmental
Law, ¶¶ 16–18 (NAFTA Chapter 11 Arb. Mar. 9, 2004) (regarding human rights issues raised by
amicus curiae); Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status, ¶¶ 3–5 (Nov. 27, 2006) (regarding human rights
issues raised by amicus curiae). Some tribunals determined that human rights were not at risk,
e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 331–32
(Sept. 28, 2007), while others concluded that the government’s human rights obligations did not
excuse its obligations to comply with investment treaty commitments. See e.g., EDF Int’l S.A v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, ¶¶ 366–69, 913–14 (June 11, 2012).
110. M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 320 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015) (noting that the treatment of human rights issues
and arguments under international investment law to date has been critiqued for the system’s
potential to “affect the human rights of its people”). See also Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in
Investor-State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
277 (2015) (“Failure of investment arbitration tribunals to give due consideration to such
arguments ‘may have a chilling effect on host capital state regulatory initiatives that are needed to
address non-investment policy objectives. . . .’”) (quoting Suzanne A. Spears, Making Way for the
Public Interest in International Investment Agreements, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY
LAW AND ARBITRATION 271, 272 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles ed., 2011)); Brunno Simma &
Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps
Towards a Methodology, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 678, 679 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (“The
tendency towards considering international investment law in a vacuum is perhaps most
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an investment arbitration tribunal that has failed to consider human
rights obligations as a defense, mitigating factor, or component of
applicable law could reduce the domestic revenue that a government
needs to respect, protect, or progressively fulfill certain human rights.
Additionally, when good faith efforts to better protect the human rights
of project-affected communities give rise to colorable claims under
investment law, states fearing reputational impacts and wanting to avoid
the costs of litigation and potential liability might be discouraged from
taking otherwise available steps to advance human rights. 111 This risk is
particularly problematic in light of the exclusionary nature of arbitral
proceedings, in which project-affected communities and rights-holders
have either no or very limited ability to provide input into
proceedings,112 in addition to the fact that arbitral claims have been
lodged—and won—around governments’ actions and inactions in the
context of community-led protests.113
The interactions between intersecting legal frameworks and
agreements discussed in this Section point to systemic imbalances and
governance gaps that governments and other stakeholders must
navigate. The application of investment law to date, moreover, creates
room for a government’s contractual obligations to be elevated to a
supranational level, where neither domestic public policy considerations
nor norms derived from other aspects of international public law, in
particular human rights law, are applied. This scenario has tangible
implications for a government’s options to address land grievances.

disturbing with regard to human rights law.”).
111. For discussions of such “chilling effects” of investment treaties, see generally Kyla
Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles
eds., 2011).
112. See, e.g., Von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/10/15 & ARB/10/25,
Procedural Order 2, ¶ 64 (June 26, 2012) (rejecting the amicus curiae application of indigenous
communities who claimed rights regarding the land at issue in the ICSID investor-state dispute).
113. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–
2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016). In this case, a mining concession—and the mining company’s conduct
with respect to local communities—generated significant social tensions and violence. The
government of Ecuador ultimately cancelled the concession, prior to the company’s conducting
all necessary consultations and securing requisite environmental approvals. In response, the
company brought an investor-state arbitration claim. The tribunal concluded that the government
had failed to do enough to affirmatively protect the company against anti-mining protests and
activities. The tribunal stated, “[p]lainly, the government in Quito could hardly have declared war
on its own people. Yet, in the Tribunal’s view, it could not do nothing.” Copper Mesa Mining
Corp., PCA Case No. 2012–2 at ¶ 6.83.
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III. ADDRESSING LAND GRIEVANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS
While potentially conflicting legal obligations pose challenges for
governments seeking to address land grievances, options do exist. In an
ideal world, governments would seek rights-compliant options that also
minimize potential legal liability under investment law or contracts.
This may prove difficult to attain in every situation: Sometimes, the best
option may leave the government exposed to potential liability under
investment law, or may not fully assuage communities’ concerns. Yet
while an informed understanding of legal obligations (and potential
risks of legal liability) can help guide decisionmaking, host
governments also should not be dissuaded from taking actions in the
public interest, including those to address land grievances.
This Section describes three options that governments may have at
their disposal to address land grievances, and highlights how such
actions might square with their relevant legal obligations discussed
above. These options focus on adjustments to applicable legal rules:
renegotiation of contracts, termination of contracts, and modification of
the domestic legal framework relevant to the investment. In many cases,
any of those options may represent just one of multiple steps that a
government might take as it seeks to right the wrongs of land-based
investments.
For example, a government may determine that restituting property to
displaced individuals or communities is necessary. Displacement from
land—particularly when it has occurred through forced evictions or
involuntary displacement—is a common trigger of grievances arising
from land investments.114 In such scenarios, restitution of land or
property115 to previous land users may be one of the most effective
remedies that a government can deploy. Of course, restitution is not
always possible.116 Yet in some cases, restitution of land or property
may be necessary for the government to comply with its human rights
114. See discussion supra Section I.B (discussing common causes of land grievances).
115. Restitution refers to “re-establish[ing] the situation which existed before the wrongful act
was committed. . . .” G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 35 (Dec. 12, 2001). This discussion focuses on
restitution as the return of land or property from which land users were displaced.
116. Basic Principles & Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions & Displacement, Annex
1 of the Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an
Adequate Standard of Living, at ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter U.N.
Evictions & Displacement Guidelines]. For example, restitution may be materially impossible
when land or property has been altered or damaged to the point that its return would not
reestablish, for land users, their situation prior to displacement. See also James Crawford, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 513, 513 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (discussing
additional situations where restitution may be materially impossible).
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obligations. For example, restitution of ancestral lands was ordered by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Sawhoyamaxa case
discussed above as a critical step toward Paraguay’s compliance with its
legal obligations.117
Restitution of land previously allocated to an investor via an investorstate contract, however, may require renegotiation or termination of the
contract. In such a situation, renegotiating or terminating the contract
may be a critical initial step that the government must take in order to
both address the concerns of its citizens and comply with its human
rights obligations. Yet such actions can also expose a State to the risks
of an ISDS claim, as discussed below.
While the three options discussed in this Section are by no means an
exhaustive list,118 they help illustrate the accompanying legal and
political factors that governments must navigate, and the challenges of
doing so. All three options also implicate investors’ contract rights and
expectations, a topic that we will come back to in greater detail in Part
IV of this Article.
A. Renegotiating with the Investor
When land grievances are tied to the legal terms of the investor-state
contract or the scope of the investor’s rights and obligations under that
contract, a government might decide that renegotiation of the investorstate contract would be an appropriate response. For long-term projects,
requests from either side to renegotiate a contract are not uncommon;119
as Jeswald Salacuse has noted, “renegotiation of a previous deal seems
to be as basic to modern business life as is negotiating a new deal for
117. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Para., Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, at ¶ 248(6) (Mar. 29, 2006) (“The State shall adopt all
legislative, administrative and other measures necessary to formally and physically convey to the
members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community their traditional lands, within three years, as set forth
in paragraphs 210 to 215 herein.”). Indeed, governments’ obligations under human rights law
require them to prioritize restitution for “all persons, groups and communities subjected to forced
evictions.” U.N. Evictions & Displacement Guidelines, supra note 116, at ¶ 64. Restitution is also
particularly important when indigenous peoples’ land has been taken without their FPIC. The UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples emphasizes that dispossessed indigenous peoples
should be granted “the option of return,” and that restitution should be provided for indigenous
“cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed
consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.” G.A. Res. 61/295, arts. 10–11 (Sept.
13, 2007).
118. These three options are part of a larger set of specific and general actions that the authors
have identified and articulated in Cordes, Johnson, and Szoke-Burke, infra note *.
119. See, e.g., Act Ratifying the Amended & Restated Concession Agreement Between The
Republic
of
Liber.
&
Firestone
Liber.,
at
2
(Feb.
22,
2008),
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-0966186576/view#/pdf (noting prior
concession agreements entered into in 1926, 1976 (amended in 1987), and 2005).

550

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 49

the first time.”120 Government requests for renegotiation in order to
address land grievances are therefore possible, and might help to ensure
that the contract survives over time.
However, the path to renegotiations may not always be
straightforward, particularly when renegotiations are not expressly
authorized in the contract.121 A range of factors may influence an
investor’s willingness to give up rights previously secured or to take on
new obligations. For example, an investor with other interests in the
country, or one that is more interested in the products it would receive
through the investment than in monetary compensation, may be more
willing to renegotiate than, say, an investor with little else to tie it to the
host country, with strong home state support, and/or with access to
investor-state arbitration under an investment treaty. 122 Renegotiation
also opens up risks for the party seeking renegotiation: The other party
generally has the right to refuse renegotiation,123 resulting in greater
leverage if it does agree to return to the negotiating table. A government
seeking to renegotiate an investor-state contract may have to concede
hard-won points that had been formalized in the original contract in
order to secure agreed changes from the investor.
Investment treaties, and how they have been interpreted, further
complicate the calculus for governments. Past arbitral decisions have
scrutinized governments’ efforts to renegotiate, and have found that a
government’s renegotiation request, coupled with political pressure or
the threat of sovereign action, can violate its obligations under an
investment treaty.124 Such findings do not prevent governments from
seeking to renegotiate using the weight that a normal contracting party
would use. Yet they create uncertainty for governments as to where the
line exists over which it is risky to step in their quest to seek
renegotiation. To the extent that contract renegotiation may be the most
appropriate response to land grievances, or the most effective way to
120. Jeswald Salacuse, Renegotiating International Project Agreements, 24 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1319, 1320 (2001).
121. See id. at 1335–42 (discussing context and causes of extra-deal renegotiations).
122. Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Lise Johnson & Sam Szoke-Burke, Land Deal Dilemmas: Grievances,
Human Rights, and Investor Protections, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. 30–31 (2016).
123. Salacuse, supra note 120, at 1335–36.
124. See, e.g., Suez v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on
Liability, ¶¶ 239–243 (July 30, 2010) (citing various sovereign and political acts that, according
to the tribunal, rendered the renegotiation impermissibly “forceful”); BG Grp. Plc. v. The
Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 309 (UNCITRAL Arb. Dec. 24, 2007) (stating that
sovereign acts aiming to “promote a new deal” with licensees violated FET requirement);
Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award, ¶¶ 7.4.18–.46 (Aug. 20, 2007) (identifying a range of “political” actions and events as
improper means of undercutting the concession and forcing a renegotiation).
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comply with human rights legal obligations, the risks of liability under
an investment treaty may therefore unduly restrict governments’ efforts.
B. Terminating an Investor-State Contract
In some scenarios, renegotiation of the investor-state contract may
not suffice to address land grievances, and termination of the contract
may be needed. For example, a government party to an investor-state
contract may desire to exit a controversial arrangement tainted by fraud
or corruption. Or, the grievances precipitated by project operations may
be so severe that the government and investor may be unable to find any
mutually acceptable approach that would support both project
continuation and the satisfactory redress of grievances.
Often, the terms of the contract and/or domestic law will specify the
grounds on which one or both parties may or must terminate the
contract, as well as any related remedies.125 This may include, for
example, the right to terminate an agreement when the other contracting
party has failed to fulfill certain obligations. Even if the contract does
not explicitly contemplate termination in certain scenarios, a
government party to an investor-state contract may determine that
termination of the contract is necessary to address the grievances of its
citizens and/or to comply with its legal obligations under human rights
law.
In seeking to terminate, a government can face both political and
legal risks. If the investor is a foreign investor, for example, the
investor’s home government may use diplomatic channels to question or
seek reversal of the decision to terminate. If there is an international
investment treaty in place that covers the investor, the investor may also
seek to bring an investor-state arbitration claim to challenge the
termination.126
Arbitral tribunals have typically determined that a government’s
breach of an investor-state contract does not constitute a breach of
125. See, e.g., Carin Smaller et al., The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for
Farmland and Water, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 52 (2014) (discussing contract
termination provisions); MODEL MINE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT: A TEMPLATE FOR
NEGOTIATION AND DRAFTING 144–49 (2011) (providing examples of different termination
clauses and discussing the aims of those clauses).
126. If the investor initiates formal investment arbitration proceedings, the investor’s home
state may then be prohibited from pursuing diplomatic protection. As explained:
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim
in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall
have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention,
unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the
award rendered in such dispute.
See ICSID Convention, supra note 69, art. 27(1).
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international law if the government was acting as any normal
contracting party.127 If, however, the government terminated the
contract through an exercise of sovereign powers (by, for example,
passing a decree or law, or issuing a judicial decision declaring the
contract void as against public policy), then that exercise of sovereign
powers could potentially give rise to an international law violation
under the FET obligation or obligation to provide adequate
compensation for an expropriation.128
However, some arbitral tribunals have also elevated contract rights
and expectations to a supranational level by finding governments liable
for contract termination even without the use of sovereign powers.129
For example, government liability for termination of the contract can
also arise under the treaty’s umbrella clause.130 The umbrella clause
allows covered foreign investors to bring claims against host
governments for contract violations (including unlawful termination)
even when the government has not exercised any sovereign powers.131
Moreover, even if a government’s termination of a contract is in
accordance with the contract itself, tribunals may still deem such an
action inconsistent with international investment law. In one dispute, for
example, a tribunal determined that (1) although the contract permitted
the government to terminate an investor-state contract for certain types
of contractual violations by the investor, and (2) although the investor
breached a provision of the contract entitling the government to
terminate the agreement,132 (3) the government’s decision to terminate
127. See, e.g., Bureau Veritas v. The Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Further
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 246–77 (Oct. 9, 2012) (finding the case was a
“contractual dispute, no more and no less”); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶¶ 342–66 (Aug. 18, 2008) (finding “no breach of
the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment”); but see, e.g., Teinver S.A. v. The Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/01, Award, ¶ 845 (July 21, 2017) (suggesting that the purpose
of the contract, not just the nature of the breach, can inject the “sovereign” element necessary to
support a finding of breach).
128. See Teinver S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/01, at ¶ 845 (listing cases where a
government’s breach of an investor-state contract did not constitute a breach of international law).
129. See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter SGSPhilippines] (concluding that breach of contract is actionable under an umbrella clause even if the
state was not acting in its sovereign capacity); but see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A.
v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 138–39
(Aug. 6, 2003) (concluding that sovereign conduct is necessary to establish a treaty breach under
the umbrella clause). Most tribunals have tended to follow the SGS-Philippines approach.
130. SGS-Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 at ¶128 (violation of contractual umbrella
clause is a breach).
131. Id.
132. In this dispute, the investor had breached a contract provision that required the investor to
seek and secure the government’s authorization before transferring its contractual rights or
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the contract was “disproportionate” to the investor’s breach and
therefore violated the FET obligation.133
C. Modifying the Governing Legal Framework
Another action that a government might take to address land
grievances is to modify the legal framework governing the investment.
In some cases, grievances may stem from a gap in the domestic legal
framework; in others, domestic laws may create or exacerbate
grievances. In either situation, adjusting relevant laws, regulations, or
administrative policies may be appropriate or necessary, as a part of the
ongoing process of governance in which legal rules are adopted,
amended, elaborated, and at times even repealed. Modification of the
governing legal framework may be undertaken by entities within the
legislative or executive branches; it may also occur in the conduct of
judicial proceedings that interpret the legal framework or craft new
common law doctrine.
Apart from adopting changes in law to address ongoing grievances, a
government might also pursue changes to its legal framework in an
effort to prevent future grievances, or as a way to better align its
legislative rules with its human rights obligations or with more recently
established international instruments and guidelines. For example,
multiple countries have worked to develop National Action Plans on
business and human rights as a way to assess the types of legal and
policy reforms that might be needed to better align with human rights
obligations and to ensure greater policy coherency.134 Some countries
have also begun in-depth efforts to implement the Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and
Forests in the Context of National Food Security—efforts that can

obligations to third parties. The contract specified that the contract “shall terminate” in the event
of “a transfer of rights and obligations of the Participation Contract without prior authorization
from the Corresponding Ministry.” Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 120 (Oct. 5, 2012) (quoting the Participation Contract at ¶ 21.1.2).
The law governing the contract also specified that the Ministry of Energy and Mines could
terminate the contract if the contractor “[t]ransfer[red] rights or enter[ed] into a private contract or
agreement for the assignment of one or more of its rights, without the Ministry’s authorization.”
Id. ¶ 121 (quoting Article 74 of Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Law). As the tribunal found, the
investor in fact transferred its rights and obligations under the contract without seeking or
securing the necessary authorization. Id. at ¶ 381.
133. Id. at ¶ 681.
134. For a list of existing national action plans on this topic, see National Action Plans,
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, https://business-humanrights.org/en/unguiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-ofinitiative/national-action-plans (last visited Nov. 28, 2017).
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include reforming laws and policies around public or state land.135
Changing the law serves as a key tool for governments seeking to
effectively address serious concerns of their citizens, including those
arising from land investments. Changes may specifically target a
particular contract, aiming to use sovereign power to reshape the
agreement’s terms. Changes may also arise from more general measures
that merely impact performance of the contract (e.g., by imposing new
obligations on the state or investor, deeming certain types of contractual
provisions invalid). In either case, a government confronts the risk that
its changes may be challenged by an investor through investment
arbitration.
A contract, for example, may set forth certain investor obligations
regarding the need to secure relevant environmental permits;
subsequently, however, legislation or regulation may be passed that
requires human rights and social impact assessments as part of the
mandatory permitting process, or provides local communities with
stronger legal rights than they previously had to challenge or even block
projects.136 Investors may allege that such legislation increases their
costs, threatens their projects, or violates explicit provisions or the
implicit structure of the contract.
Tribunals have tended to agree with the contention that changes to
the legal framework that are inconsistent with a specific contractual
provision,137 or with a quasi-contractual commitment,138 will violate an
135. The FAO has worked with a number of countries to begin implementation of the
Voluntary Guidelines. See MELINDA DAVIES, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VOLUNTARY
GUIDELINES ON RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE IN THE LAND LEGISLATION OF SIERRA
LEONE: ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT REPORT (2015). For further examples from other country
contexts, see also Newsletters Archive, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/tenure/newsletters/newsletters-archive/en/ (last visited Nov. 28,
2017) (documenting efforts to implement the Voluntary Guidelines).
136. See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21,
Witness Statement of César Zegarra, ¶ 28 n.32 (Oct. 6, 2015) (citing Supreme Decree on the
Adjustments of Mining Petitions and Suspension of Admissions of Mining Petitions, Supreme
Decree No. 033-2011-EM (June 25, 2011)) (providing that consultation requirements were
mandatory for mining or oil operations); Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶ 117 (Dec. 27, 2010). See also Oxus Gold v. The Republic of
Uzb., Award, ¶ 827 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 17, 2015) (finding a breach of FET due to
legislative changes that contradicted the commitments in a tax stabilization clause).
137. As the ICSID held in Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic:
The expectation of the investor is undoubtedly “legitimate”, and hence subject to
protection under the fair and equitable treatment clause, if the host State has explicitly
assumed a specific legal obligation for the future, such as by contracts, concessions or
stabilisation clauses on which the investor is therefore entitled to rely as a matter of
law.
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶ 117 (Dec. 27, 2010). See also Oxus Gold v.
The Republic of Uzb., Award, ¶ 827 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 17, 2015) (finding a breach of
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investment treaty. Tribunals have similarly interpreted contracts as
containing implied commitments of stabilization, concluding that
investors are entitled to rely on the general contours of the legal and
business framework in force at the time the investors made their
investments or entered into contracts with the host government.139
Changes to the legal framework—even if not precluded by contract—
may, if too dramatic in the eyes of the tribunal, result in investment
treaty liability.140
In sum, legitimate options that governments have for addressing
human rights concerns arising from land investments include
terminating the relevant investor-state contract; renegotiating the
contract; or modifying the general legal framework, including in ways
that affect performance of the contract or even quasi-contractual
FET due to legislative changes that contradicted the commitments in a tax stabilization clause).
138. See, e.g., Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prods. Societe S.A. v. Republic of Alb.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, ¶¶ 649, 651 (Mar. 30, 2015) (reasoning that the tribunal had
to identify whether the government had provided the investor “assurances and representations”
regarding the stability of its port regime, since “[t]he fact that Respondent was under no
contractual obligation to keep the port open for Claimant’s vessels does not answer the question
whether Respondent had an obligation under the FET standard to provide stability of the port
regime and use for the period of the lease contract.”); Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/20, Award, ¶¶ 527–29, 668–69 (Dec. 11, 2013) (noting that an enforceable expectation
of regulatory stability can be created through a promise, assurance, or representation that is either
explicit or implicit, to which the government need not have intended to bind itself). See also
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
145 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that “legitimate expectations” regarding the stability of a particular
legal framework can be based on “any undertakings . . . made explicitly or implicitly by the host
state”). For some tribunals, commitments of stability can arise merely from the legal framework
in place at the time the investment is made; for other tribunals, however, something more, such as
a specific representation directed at the investor, is required. For a discussion of other relevant
cases, see Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State
‘Commitments,’ and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361
(2013) (discussing investor-state contracts in the context of both international and domestic law).
139. Some tribunals have indicated that the guarantee of stability is not a total guarantee
against change, but a guarantee that change will not be too fundamental or dramatic (as ultimately
judged by the tribunal):
[The] obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment necessarily embraces an
obligation to provide fundamental stability in the essential characteristics of the legal
regime relied upon by investors in making long-term investments. This does not mean
that regulatory regimes cannot evolve. Surely they can. . . . However, the . . . obligation
to accord fair and equitable treatment means that regulatory regimes cannot be
radically altered as applied to existing investments in ways that deprive investors who
invested in reliance on those regimes of their investment’s value.
Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award, ¶ 382 (May
4, 2017). See also Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Partial Final
Award, ¶¶ 281–92 (UNCITRAL Arb. May 6, 2016) (finding Ecuador’s coercive conduct violated
claimant’s legitimate expectations of fair treatment).
140. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 138 (discussing cases that have violated an investment
treaty through inconsistent quasi-contractual commitments).
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commitments to the investor. Previous outcomes from investor-state
disputes indicate that, when combined with an investor’s ability to
access treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement, such courses of
action may be extremely costly, generating litigation costs, potential
liabilities, and even reputational harms.141 Tribunals have effectively
elevated contractual and quasi-contractual commitments to a
supranational plane on which the commitments are strongly shielded
from domestic interference. The next Section discusses in more detail
how tribunals have approached some of these issues, the implications of
those approaches, and how alternative approaches may produce
different outcomes that are more responsive to human rights concerns.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SUPRANATIONAL PROTECTIONS, AND A CALL FOR A
MORE CRITICAL APPROACH
Once a foreign investor has secured contract rights in the host state,
investment treaties—as they have been interpreted by arbitral
tribunals—provide that investor with strong protections at the
international level from government conduct that frustrates those
rights.142 Additionally, even without clear and vested contract rights, an
investor that has developed “expectations” based on specific
government commitments or assurances may benefit from similarly
strong protections against government conduct that frustrates those
expectations. Fairness and utilitarian considerations can provide
important reasons to limit a government’s ability to directly or indirectly
frustrate rights and expectations that the government had previously
generated.143 At the same time, tribunals’ broad approaches toward
recognizing and protecting investors’ contract rights and expectations
may undermine governments’ willingness and ability to protect, respect,
and fulfill human rights. In recognition of this potential consequence, it
is imperative that tribunals be more critical of what alleged rights and
interests they protect. This Section elaborates reasons why tribunals

141. On the issue of reputational costs, see Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent
Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L
ORG. 401 (2011) (finding that the mere filing of an investor-state claim is associated with reduced
foreign direct investment, and a finding of liability is associated with even further declines).
142. As discussed supra, Section II.A
143. Fairness and utilitarian considerations similarly are used to justify the doctrine of
estoppel, protecting those who had acted in reliance on the promises of another. Policy
considerations relevant to whether the doctrine of estoppel should be applied against private
parties may not, however, be the same as policy considerations relevant to whether it should be
applied against the government. For a discussion of these issues in the U.S. context, see Alan I.
Saltman, The Government’s Liability for Actions of Its Agents That Are Not Specifically
Authorized: The Continuing Influence of Merrill and Richmond, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 775 (2003).
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should take a more critical approach, as well as techniques for how they
could do so.144
The argument advanced here is not that any government entity should
be free to breach or nullify what another government entity or its
predecessor has granted. Rather, our argument is that, particularly due
to the legal force of their awards, tribunals should recognize that not all
promises granted in contracts or given through quasi-contractual
conduct are worthy of legal protection—a concept recognized by
domestic courts across jurisdictions, including in jurisdictions generally
deemed to have strong protections for economic rights and interests,
such as the United States. For instance, contracts, or specific provisions
therein, may be deemed void, voidable, or unenforceable on various
grounds, including those relating to the capacity or authority of the
promisor,145 the conduct of the promisee,146 the circumstances under
which the promise was given147 or recorded,148 the circumstances
during performance of the contract,149 or the subject matter of the
promise.150 Domestic courts asked to enforce contracts are often
requested to apply these contract principles to prevent, or adjust,

144. Another area requiring critical reflection, which we do not engage with in this Article for
reasons of scope and space constraints, is of course the standards of protections that tribunals are
interpreting investment treaties to provide, such as those related to the FET and umbrella clause
obligations. Rather, we focus here on the nature of the rights and interests protected.
145. Legal or mental capacity can be relevant. See, e.g., Robinson v. Heard, 2001-1697, p. 5
(La. 2/26/02); 809 So. 2d 943, 946 (addressing the capacity of a sole proprietorship to contract);
Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (stating, in the context of U.S. law, that
“anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his
authority”).
146. A contract may, for instance, be deemed invalid if one party was induced to enter into the
contract based on the other party’s misrepresentation of a material fact. 14-81 RICHARD R.
POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81.02 (1968).
147. Under some conceptions of the doctrine of unconscionability, a contract can be deemed
unconscionable if it was concluded between parties of grossly unequal bargaining power. See
Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Eng’g, Inc., 364 S.E.2d 215, 220 (Va. 1988).
148. “Statute of Frauds” requirements dictate that certain types of contracts be in writing and
signed by the promisor. The requirement that contracts be in writing often applies specifically for
contracts relating to the sale of land and other real property. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)
(2015) (discussing the types of contracts subject to the Statute of Frauds).
149. The doctrine of impossibility of performance, for example, can apply when changes in
circumstances, including changes in the law, render performance impossible or impracticable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
150. This can relate, for instance, to contracts for the sale of illegal goods or services. See,
e.g., David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 563, 574 (2012) (discussing cases where a bargain will be declared unenforceable); M. P.
Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 (1966) (noting the
difficulty in determining whether a contract is illegal).
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enforcement or performance.151
In international investment law, however, tribunals appear less likely
to scrutinize the legitimacy or enforceability of contracts.152 Although
states have asked tribunals to interpret investor-state contracts in
accordance with governing law and the limits that governing law places
on contracting parties’ abilities to strictly enforce contract performance,
tribunals have in the past been unresponsive to such pleas. 153 Indeed,
even where states have argued that the contract or promise is invalid and
unenforceable under domestic law, tribunals have declared that they will
bind the state to the deal anyway—protecting the investors’ interests
even when doing so may require adherence to an illegal deal that
frustrates the rule of law in the respective host countries.154
151. Some courts have also seized the opportunity to develop new doctrines regarding the
conditions and circumstances under which contracts will be enforced. See, e.g., ROBERT W.
CLARK, INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN IMPROVIDENT AND
UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS 3051 (1987); Colleen McCullough, Comment, Unconscionability
as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 779 (2016) (discussing evolution in the
doctrine of unconscionability in U.S. federal and state law).
152. See, e.g., Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. The Republic of Ghana, Award, ¶ 11.93
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 11, 2014) (applying the doctrine of estoppel against the government to
enforce an otherwise unconstitutional contract); see also cases cited infra note 154 (listing cases
where tribunals have been unresponsive to pleas asking for interpretations of investor-state
contracts and mostly protecting investors’ interests).
153. Illustrating this are cases rejecting the applicability of the theory of imprevisión, which
can apply in domestic contract law to ease obligations when changed circumstances render
performance impossible. See, e.g., Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador,
Partial Final Award, ¶ 241 (UNCITRAL Arb. May 6, 2016) (noting that the “principle would
purportedly apply to ‘an unprecedented and extraordinary increase of international oil prices’”);
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶¶ 214, 284–91 (July 30,
2010) (recounting Argentina’s objections to, and the tribunal’s reasoning regarding, rejection of
the theory); BG Grp. Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶¶ 99–100 (UNCITRAL
Arb. Dec. 24, 2007) (“More specifically, Article 1198 of the Argentine Civil Code [setting forth
the theory of imprevisión] does not apply in the context of an international investment dispute
governed by Article 8(4) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT. . . . [T]he domestic law defense of
unforeseen changed circumstances is of little assistance to Respondent here.”); Sempra Energy
Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 243–46 (Sept. 28, 2007)
(discussing the theory but not clearly applying it as a distinct doctrine under Argentine law).
154. See, e.g., Awdi v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, ¶ 289 (Mar. 2, 2015)
(finding the government to have violated the FET obligation after the Constitutional Court
deemed that different transfers of contract rights and property were illegal under domestic law);
Bankswitch Ghana Ltd., ¶ 11.93 (UNCITRAL Arb.); Micula v. Rom., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/20, Award, ¶¶ 675–77 (Dec. 11, 2013) (finding that the government’s promised
incentives established legitimate expectations that legislative changes could not undo); Arif v.
Republic of Mold., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award, ¶ 547(f) (Apr. 8, 2013) (finding that the
country had violated the FET obligation after domestic courts found the relevant investor-state
contract to be illegal); R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guat., Second Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, ¶¶ 146–47 (May 18, 2010) (finding that the
government was barred from objecting to the decision based on its own law, which it knowingly
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By not taking seriously constraints imposed on investor-state
contracts under domestic law, arbitrators allow international investment
law to sanction and empower illegal conduct. This expands the rights of
investors beyond what they could have legitimately bargained for.
The prospect of expansive investor rights raises additional concerns:
both that arbitrations may stymie development of domestic law, and that
tribunal decisions regarding the scope and validity of investor rights
may be based on that stunted legal framework. Domestic law on
contracts can evolve to respond to new issues, policies, and realities. For
instance, the meaning of what is an “unconscionable” contract, or
conceptions of what is unenforceable as against public policy, may not
only differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but may also change over
time. Assume the following: An investor-state dispute arises when the
state seeks to renegotiate a land-concession agreement that it considers
to be unenforceable as against public policy, an agreement with
extremely one-sided terms benefitting the investor and with clear
negative impacts on non-parties. There is, however, no jurisprudence
yet in the host country, the laws of which govern the contract, that
clearly addresses unenforceability of contracts due to the specific issues
prompting the government’s concern. Will the government be able to
succeed before an investment tribunal on its claims that the contract is
unenforceable as against public policy? Decisions issued to date
indicate that the government’s success on those facts is doubtful. In the
absence of jurisprudence establishing a rule of unenforceability
applicable to the case, it seems unlikely that arbitral tribunals would
accept the government’s arguments.
Even more problematic is the fact that, had the investor-state dispute
first gone to domestic courts, and had those courts found all or some of
the contract to be invalid, those judicial decisions could subsequently be
the basis for a separate investment treaty challenge by the investor. 155
The approaches adopted by tribunals to date are by no means
inevitable. Tribunals, for instance, could have followed (and could opt
in the future to follow) an approach whereby investors’ economic
interests are only protected under investment treaties if they are

overlooked in drafting); Kardassopoulos v. Geor., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 191 (July 6, 2007) (holding that the government cannot avoid representations in the
agreement by claiming they are void under Georgian law). The Bankswitch decision was a
commercial case, but reaches its holding due to the tribunal’s decision to incorporate
“international law” into the terms of the contract. If this were a treaty-based claim, it is the
authors’ opinion that this particular tribunal would have likely found a breach of the umbrella
clause and the FET provision as well.
155. Arif, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23; Awdi, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13.
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recognized as vested rights under the relevant domestic legal system.156
In practice, this might mean deferring action or refusing protection
when it is unclear, or when the investor has been unable to establish,
that the rights alleged are actually valid under domestic law. By only
protecting valid economic rights recognized under domestic law,
tribunals would better preserve the domestic sphere as the primary place
for stakeholders to establish and (re)shape conceptions of economic
property.157 Such an approach could help bolster legal norms and
institutions within host countries, thereby supporting stronger rule of
law within those countries; it might also help to safeguard the voice and
power of citizens and communities by preserving their ability to contest
the legitimacy of investors’ claims to own or use the land.158
If tribunals were to adopt a rule to only protect legal rights that are
valid and vested under domestic law, such an approach might reduce the
number of investment arbitration decisions that privilege investor rights
and expectations over competing—and potentially valid—claims.
Nevertheless, tribunal decisions on the validity of an instrument (or
rights granted in that instrument) under domestic law may still be
especially protective of investor interests and insensitive to competing
rights and claims. This is due both to the closed nature of investor-state
arbitration, which limits the opportunities for those with competing
rights and claims to directly advance their arguments in the
arbitration,159 and to the reality that the government defending the claim
156. Indeed, that is the approach tribunals have more consistently used when determining
whether an investment has been expropriated. Nevertheless, under the FET obligation they have
expanded the scope of their protections to cover economic interests that fall short of rights.
157. See also Lone Pine Res. Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2, Submission
of the United States of America, ¶ 3 nn.3–4 (Aug. 16, 2017) (counseling against protection of
contingent “interests” and emphasizing the need to look at domestic law to determine the
existence and scope of a property right).
158. One reason tribunals have bound governments to contracts or promises that are not legal
under domestic law is the premise that governments cannot use domestic law as a reason for
evading their international law responsibilities. This is a fundamental principle of international
law. Yet this principle applies to questions of whether states have violated their international law
obligations (by, for example, expropriating property rights) and should therefore be held
responsible under international law, not to questions of whether and to what extent property rights
have been created in the first place. See, e.g., MONIQUE SASSON, SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: THE UNSETTLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW 87 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2010) (discussing property
rights in the international investment law context); Venez. Holdings, B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 168–74 (Mar. 9, 2017)
(discussing whether the investors had acquired property rights).
159. As of writing, there were no investment treaties or arbitration rules permitting non-parties
to investor-state arbitrations to intervene in disputes as a matter of right. Non-parties may seek to
provide input into the dispute as amicus curiae, but tribunals generally have wide discretion under
applicable treaties and arbitration rules regarding whether to accept such participation. See, e.g.,
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may be hesitant to acknowledge or concede limits on its powers to
contract.
A government’s reluctance to concede those limits may be
understandable—such an acknowledgement might call into question the
validity of other existing deals, as well as the government’s ongoing
power to promote investment, raise taxes, or advance its development
aims. Yet in eschewing any argument admitting the limits of its powers,
a government denies arbitrators the opportunity to better understand the
complex disputes that can arise at the domestic level. In particular, this
risks keeping arbitrators in the dark about disagreements between
central government officials and local land users regarding their
respective rights and interests over specific land and decisionmaking
around it. While local land users may have legitimate objections under
the domestic legal system (and under international human rights law as
well), their lack of standing before an arbitral tribunal means that their
voice and perspectives may not be heard by arbitrators. Rather, the
central government, which lacks incentives to raise those perspectives,
is often the only voice representing stakeholders within the respondent
state that the tribunal will hear.160
The exclusionary design of investor-state arbitration thus renders it
difficult to ensure that, even if proof of legality under domestic law
became a condition for protecting investor rights, the arbitral tribunal’s
examination of domestic law would take into consideration arguments
put forth by other constituencies within the respondent state (such as
local land users) that have a stake in the decision. While such
constituencies are ostensibly represented by the respondent state, their
interests are not always aligned with those of the state, as discussed
above.
Arbitrators could seek to proactively overcome these participation
barriers, using tools that they have under many arbitral rules. 161 For
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 4 (2014) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]
(governing non-disputing party submissions, and permitting the tribunal to allow such
submissions in certain contexts, but not providing for intervention as of right).
160. See, e.g., Von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25, Procedural
Order No. 2, ¶ 5 (“The Respondent stated that it had no objection to [the amicus applicants] being
allowed to make submissions provided they . . . do not impinge on or amount to a challenge to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Zimbabwe.”).
161. As a general matter, arbitrators have significant discretion to organize the proceedings.
See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 159, at art. 17(1) (2010) (“Subject to
these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at an appropriate stage of
the proceedings each party is given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case.”); id. at art.
27(3) (“At any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may require the parties to
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instance, arbitrators could use their powers to decline to hear cases until
competing claims over rights were resolved in other fora, such as
domestic courts or human rights bodies,162 or could dismiss cases
altogether when an arbitral decision on alleged rights would
substantially harm the rights of affected non-parties. They could also
seek and secure input on factual and legal issues from diverse
constituencies.163 Such steps could increase the information,
perspectives, and legal arguments available to arbitrators. Yet given
other barriers to participation of affected stakeholders—such as
language constraints and limited resources to participate
meaningfully—these steps would not foreclose the risk that arbitrators
base their decisions regarding the meaning of domestic law on limited
inputs provided by a narrow set of stakeholders.
Of course, even if tribunals were to only enforce contract rights that
clearly complied with domestic law, inclusively defined and
determined, there is still a risk that tribunals would enforce concession
rights that are inconsistent with other sources of international law or
policy. Such could be the case, for instance, with land investment
contracts entered into through non-transparent and non-consultative
processes, and with provisions that do not comply with aspects of the
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of
Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of National Food
Security,164 or that are inconsistent with the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights165 and their attached
Principles for Responsible Contracts.166 The opportunity for the
investor to use international investment law and ISDS to ensure the
government’s adherence to contracts or projects that ignore or thwart
such guidance undermines broader pushes to improve corporate
produce documents, exhibits or other evidence. . . .”); id. at art. 29(1) (“After consultation with
the parties, the arbitral tribunal may appoint one or more independent experts to report to it, in
writing, on specific issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.”).
162. Bureau Veritas v. The Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Further Decision
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 284 (Oct. 9, 2012) (finding the case inadmissible, but issuing a
stay of the proceedings, rather than dismissing them entirely, in order to review the case if the
claimant’s claims subsequently became admissible).
163. This course of action may, however, be objectionable to the disputing parties. One
concern therefore is that arbitrators, who are appointed by disputing parties and presumably
would like to be appointed in future investor-state disputes, may be reluctant to take action
opposed by both disputing parties.
164. WFS GUIDELINES, supra note 8.
165. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER (2011).
166. U.N. Responsible Contracts, supra note 79.
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conduct. It also dampens the incentives for investors to proactively align
their strategies and tactics with best practices and with their
responsibilities under international human rights law.167 These risks are
especially present when non-compliance with those international law
principles helped precipitate the grievances that ultimately led to the
investor-state dispute.168
In some cases, tribunals have deemed contracts unenforceable on the
ground that they violated international public policy.169 They have also
affirmed that international law is relevant to defining the content of

167. For arguments speaking to ways in which human rights legal obligations and
responsibilities should influence investors’ claims, see Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of
Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Submission as an “Other Person” Pursuant to Article 836 and
Annex 836.1 of the Peru-Canada FTA (June 9, 2016).
168. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–
2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016). In this case, local communities that stood to be affected by the
proposed mining activities underlying the Copper Mesa dispute alleged that they had not been
adequately consulted regarding the project, and that they instead had been threatened with and
exposed to violence. These allegations were made both in Ecuador and abroad: to domestic
officials, including Ecuador’s Ombudsman; in Canadian courts; and to Canada’s National Contact
Point. See also Courting Justice: Victims of Mining Abuses Sue in Canada, MININGWATCH
CANADA (last updated Feb. 11, 2012), https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2011/6/6/courting-justicevictims-mining-abuses-sue-canada (recapping the lawsuit); More Troubles for Ascendant:
Ecuador’s Ombudsman Intervenes in the Junín Case, MININGWATCH CANADA (July 7, 2006,
12:39
PM),
https://miningwatch.ca/news/2006/7/7/more-troubles-ascendant-ecuadorsombudsman-intervenes-jun-n-case (Ombudsman addressing irregularities surrounding the mining
project); OECD Complaint against Ascendant Copper: Canadian and Ecuadorian Organizations
Allege Vancouver-based Ascendant Copper Breached International Corporate Responsibility
Standards in Biodiversity Hotspot, MININGWATCH CANADA (May 18, 2005, 2:09 PM),
https://miningwatch.ca/news/2005/5/18/oecd-complaint-against-ascendant-copper-canadian-andecuadorian-organizations-allege (discussing complaint under the OECD Guidelines). Community
concerns regarding adequacy of consultation under domestic and international law contributed to
opposition against the mining project; the failure to consult was ultimately cited by the
government as a reason for its decision to terminate the investor’s concession. The investor
subsequently challenged the government’s decision to terminate the concession, and prevailed in
investor-state arbitration, securing an award for the majority of the expenses that the investor
incurred in trying to develop the project. The tribunal concluded that tensions and violent
conflicts between the mining company and affected communities—tensions and conflicts that,
according to the tribunal, were made more severe by the investor’s negligent (at best) and
concessionaire’s knowingly wrongful conduct—meant that “the prospects of the Junín
concessions being successfully developed by the Claimant were uncertain or even unlikely (albeit
not impossible).” Copper Mesa Mining Corp., PCA Case No. 2012–2 at ¶¶ 6.90, 6.97–.102. The
tribunal’s decision therefore cushioned the blow the investor would have likely otherwise felt due
to its own misdeeds, an example of how arbitration can reduce the risk to investors of engaging in
substandard practices.
169. See, e.g., World Duty Free Co. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7,
Award, ¶¶ 138–57 (Oct. 4, 2006) (discussing bribery and finding it “contrary to international
public policy”); Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26,
Award, ¶¶ 245–52 (Aug. 2, 2006) (finding that fraudulent investment would violate public
policy).
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contract rights and obligations.170 Yet tribunals have also read the
contents of international public policy through a particular lens, one that
emphasizes the role of certain policy principles—such as “pacta sunt
servanda” (or “promises shall be kept”), promissory estoppel, or
proportionality—that may apply to strengthen investors’ alleged rights
or expectations.171 This same lens more narrowly circumscribes the
roles of other public policies (such as policies of good governance and
transparency) that might weaken the investors’ contract or quasicontract claims.172 Similarly, tribunals have been reluctant to grapple
with contentions that other international law frameworks—including
human rights law—place fundamental limits on the scope and nature of
investors’ claimed rights.173
This Article does not advocate in favor of an international law
170. See, e.g., Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award,
¶¶ 618–25 (Dec. 8, 2016) (“The protection of this universal basic human right constitutes the
framework within which Claimants should frame their expectations.”).
171. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012–
2, Award (Mar. 15, 2016) ¶¶ 5.54–.60 (holding that the treaty only required legality in the initial
making of the investment; illegality in the operation of—which included ongoing investment in—
the project could not, according to the arbitrators, preclude the tribunal from taking jurisdiction
over the investor’s claims); Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. The Republic of Ghana, Award, ¶ 11.97
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 11, 2014) (finding an international public policy of estoppel against the
government, but placing less weight on adherence to the law and good governance notions of
transparency); Vannessa Ventures Ltd. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)04/6, Award, ¶ 167 (Jan. 16, 2013) (stating that “the jurisdictional significance of the
‘legality requirement’ in the definition of an investment in Article I(f) is exhausted once the
investment has been made”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 120 (Oct. 5, 2012) (applying the principle of proportionality to hold the
government liable for wrongfully exercising its contract rights).
172. See cases cited supra note 170 (discussing the multiple ways in which courts have
applied different policy principles).
173. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp., PCA Case No. 2012–2 at ¶¶ 2.9, 5.64. In Copper
Mesa, the tribunal stated that one of the principal issues in the case was whether the Claimant
“owned and controlled” its investments in accordance with Ecuadorian law, including
international human rights law as incorporated in Ecuadorian law. It nevertheless subsequently
determined that the fact that Ecuador had not timely objected to the mining company’s failure to
consult with local communities and failure to respect local citizens’ human rights meant that the
respondent was subsequently “precluded” from arguing that the company’s claims could not or
should not be heard by the tribunal. See also Von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, ¶ 62 (June 26, 2012) (The tribunal stated that the
investors/claimants “themselves recognize that [the indigenous communities] have some interest
in the land over which the Claimants assert full legal title. . . . It may therefore well be that the
determinations of the Arbitral Tribunals in these proceedings will have an impact on the interests
of the indigenous communities.” The tribunals ultimately rejected the indigenous communities’
amicus application on the basis that the disputing parties themselves had not put human rights at
issue in the case, and that the indigenous communities’ arguments were adverse to and may
unduly prejudice the claimants). Suez v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19,
Decision on Liability, ¶ 262 (July 30, 2010) (“The texts of the three BITs in question do not
specifically exclude or allow the admissibility of a defense of necessity.”).
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framework that enables governments to terminate or unilaterally modify
foreign investors’ rights whenever it faces competing claims from
domestic constituents. Yet we do argue that investor-state tribunals, to
the extent they continue to play a role in adjudicating investment
disputes, must be much more critical regarding the nature and scope of
contract rights (and expectations) that they deem enforceable. This
aligns with arguments that international investment arbitration is a
public function, and that this public function should “shape the
normative understanding of the role of arbitrators in investment treaty
cases, including their professional and ethical obligations and the way
they exercise their procedural powers in conducting arbitral
proceedings.”174
Even taking a more transactional view of arbitration and arbitrators—
a view in which arbitrators solely resolve disputes between parties on a
case-by-case basis, and do not effectively create law or have policy
impacts on non-parties—one can see that the tools, methodologies, and
rationales they employ to decide the disputes175 are not always
inevitable. Rather, their selection reflects tribunals’, arbitral
institutions’, and the arbitration industry’s policy choices and value
judgments. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that even commercial
arbitral tribunals’ approaches are informed by policy considerations.176
174. Stephan W. Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 401, 406 (2010).
175. This includes, for example, arbitrators’ approaches to the applicable burden of proof,
their views of what evidence should and should not be relied upon to support that burden, their
interpretations of conflicts of law rules, and their interpretations of the content of governing
substantive law. Commercial arbitrators have also played a policy role through their decisions to
“internationalize” a contract, going beyond the domestic law specified as applying to the dispute
in order to apply select principles of international public policy deemed relevant and controlling
by the tribunal. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 110, at 23 (discussing global public policy in the
context of investment protection); Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International
Investment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J.
215, 230–31 (1996) (discussing as particularly relevant “the imposition of new environmental
obligations . . . reinterpreting existing law on which the investment decision may to some extent
have been based”).
176. See, e.g., Bankswitch Ghana Ltd. v. The Republic of Ghana, Award, ¶ 11.72
(UNCITRAL Arb. Apr. 11, 2014) (“Apart from public international law, international public
policy as applied consistently in international arbitration . . . has to be considered by this
Tribunal.”). Further, Joshua Karton has written:
[There is] a widespread attitude among international arbitration practitioners and
commentators that the governing law often does not matter much. International
arbitration has been described as having a ‘lawless’ aspect, in that tribunals may decide
based on what they see as the most commercially reasonable outcome rather than on
strict application of the law.
Joshua Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 4, 4 (2015).
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To date, tribunals’ views of the impacts their decisions can have, and
of the sources of law that should inform their decisions, have been
relatively myopic. While tribunals have concluded that enforcing
contracts and quasi-contractual promises can encourage increased
investment (an often-stated objective of investment treaties), they have
not similarly recognized that the protections offered by tribunals can
negatively affect competing rights and claims. Nor have tribunals noted
their potential to marginalize the role of domestic institutions as the core
fora in which property rights claims are shaped and reshaped over time.
Tribunals could operationalize a more critical role by employing
various complementary strategies and tools. As highlighted above,
tribunals should proactively seek input from non-parties whose rights
could be adversely affected by a tribunal decision. Tribunals should
further clarify that the investor has the burden of establishing the
undisputed validity of its alleged contract rights—the rights the investor
is claiming to be infringed—under both domestic and international law.
This would include establishing that the alleged contract rights do not
run contrary to human rights law.177 Finally, tribunals should dismiss or
stay cases when the claimants assert rights that, if recognized by the
tribunal, would adversely affect the rights of non-parties. So long as
international investment treaties continue to provide a privileged avenue
for investors to validate their rights and expectations through ISDS, a
fundamentally different approach to such dispute settlement is needed in
order to mitigate the risks presented by an investor-centric legal system
to other stakeholders and interests. This approach must ensure that the
rights protected in this area of international law are consistent with, and
do not undermine, broader international norms of law and policy,
including human rights law. These recommendations can help, but
represent a major shift from current practices.
177. If domestic law deserves deference by investment arbitral tribunals in determining the
validity of an investor’s alleged contract rights or expectations, why then do we argue that
international human rights law must also be considered in such an assessment? Why is
“intrusion” of one type of international law in the domestic sphere more appropriate than another?
We take this view primarily because of the deep distinctions between international investment
law and international human rights law. International human rights law is fundamentally about
protecting inherent, universal, and inalienable rights that all humans have. See, e.g., What Are
Human Rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (last visited
Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx. Because
these rights are inherent regardless of a state’s specific domestic legal framework, intrusion of
international human rights law in the domestic sphere to protect human rights is acceptable.
International investment law, on the other hand, is not concerned with inherent rights, but serves
essentially as a tool of economic governance. The intrusion of international investment law in the
domestic sphere is, at its core, a manipulation of law to protect certain economic interests over
others; those economic interests are not inherent or inalienable rights.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has explored how host governments’ legal obligations—
especially under international investment law and investor-state
contracts—can affect or constrain their ability to meaningfully address
grievances arising from land-based investments. These implications are
also relevant for concerns arising from other types of investments. The
governmental obligations found in international investment law,
international human rights law, and investor-state contracts intersect and
interact in complex ways. Differing enforcement mechanisms also
complicate the calculus. Resolving these tensions can be difficult for
governments, which may struggle to find ways of complying with their
human rights obligations to individuals and communities affected by
investments without exposing themselves to liability under international
investment law or their investor-state contracts. The Article nonetheless
proposed three options related to legal frameworks that governments
can employ to address land grievances. Knowledge of such options, and
their associated drawbacks, will become increasingly relevant as more
governments encounter grievances arising from investments.
Given the risks that such options raise in the context of international
investment law, the Article also examined current practices of arbitral
tribunals adjudicating claims brought by investors under investment
treaties, and argued that tribunals must be much more critical regarding
the nature and scope of contract rights (and expectations) that they deem
enforceable. Key to this is a recognition that the richness of domestic
legal contractual doctrines can help to ensure that the interpretation and
enforcement of investors’ claimed rights does not unduly constrain
governments’ willingness and ability to comply with international
human rights obligations.
We do not advocate for the ability of a government entity to always
and with impunity rescind commitments made by its predecessor or by
another government entity; rather, we implore arbitrators to more
seriously interrogate whether and when express or implied promises
made to investors are worthy of legal protection. While this would be an
incremental adjustment to the international investment law regime (the
future of which is not addressed in this Article), it would still require a
substantial shift from current practices. In the absence of a fuller
overhaul of the investment law system, this shift would provide a
critical stopgap measure to help ensure that arbitral decisions under
investment treaties do not undermine governments’ abilities to uphold
their human rights obligations or to address the concerns of their
citizens.

